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1989 TORT "REFORM" IN MISSISSIPPI:
MODIFICATION OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
AND THE ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION
H. Wesley Williams, III
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1910, the State of Mississippi acquired a leadership role in the progressive
movement to abolish the harsh doctrine of contributory negligence by becoming
the first state to adopt a "pure" form of comparative negligence.1 Although any
form of comparative negligence is clearly preferable to the "all or nothing" ap-
proach of contributory negligence, the adoption of the "pure" form indicates a spe-
cial commitment to the underlying values of a comparative negligence system.
Unlike the "modified" system,2 the "pure" form of comparative negligence allows a
contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover even though his or her negligence ex-
ceeds that of the defendant.' The flip side, of course, is that the plaintiffs recovery
is reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to that particular plaintiff.'
So at the very least, "pure" comparative negligence embodies the principle that
losses should be apportioned according to the shares of negligence attributable to
each of the parties involved.5
1. Actof April 16, 1910, ch. 135, 191OMiss. LAWS 125 (codified as amended at Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-
15 (1972)). Actually, Mississippi was the first state to adopt a general comparative negligence act. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 471 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON].
2. Under the "modified" version of comparative negligence, the "plaintiffs contributory negligence does not
bar recovery so long as it remains below a specified proportion of the total fault." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
1, at 473.
3. See VIcTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.1, at 29 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ]
(citing William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 n.2 (1953)).
4. Id.
5. See Richard N. Pearson*, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws -An Analysis of the Al-
ternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343, 361 (1980).
In a modified system "responsibility" is not borne in proportion to fault to the same extent as it is under a
pure system .... In other words, fidl adoption of the proportionate responsibility concept implies the
pure system because in a modified system an important subclass of tortfeasors do not bear responsibility in
proportion to theirfault; for example, in Oklahoma, all those who injure plaintiffs who are more negligent
than themselves bear no responsibility.
William J. McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several Liability Because of Comparative Negligence -A
Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979) (second emphasis added).
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The purpose of this comment is to examine, in light of the Mississippi Legisla-
ture's latest pronouncement on the subject,6 the effect of "pure" comparative negli-
gence principles on two traditional methods of loss apportionment. The two
methods of apportionment are joint and several liability and contribution among
joint tortfeasors.' "The first of these doctrines determines how the recovery is to
be apportioned among the defendants vis-a-vis the plaintiff, and the second deter-
mines the apportionment among the defendants vis-a-vis each other."8 In essence,
the mere existence of joint and several liability creates a need for loss-shifting de-
vices like contribution.9 The common element to these two methods of loss appor-
tionment is that they are applicable only in the multiple tortfeasor context. The
comparative negligence statute in Mississippi purports to apply to all cases of per-
sonal injury. This suggests that the loss apportionment principles of "pure" com-
parative negligence would permeate into the multiple tortfeasor context as well.
Are joint and several liability and contribution consistent with the underlying prin-
ciples of "pure" comparative negligence; if not, has the legislature made any pro-
gress towards that end in section 85-5-7?
This article will attempt to accomplish several goals. First, it will examine the
status of Mississippi law before the passage of House Bill 1171. After discussing
6. In 1989, House Bill 1171 was passed and became law. It provided:
(1) As used in this section, "fault" means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of
injury or death to another person or persons, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic
injury, including but not limited to negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability or failure to
warn. Fault shall not include any tort which results from an act or omission committed with a specific
wrongful intent.
(2) Except as may be otherwise provided in subsection (6) of this section, in any civil action based on
fault, the liability for damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be joint and several only to the
extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death or loss to recover fifty percent (50%) of his recov-
erable damages.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (2) and (6) of this section, in any civil action based on
fault, the liability for damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be several only, and not joint and
several and ajoint-tortfeasor shall be liable only for the amount of damages allocated to him in direct pro-
portion to his percentage of fault. In assessing percentages of fault an employer and the employer's em-
ployee or a principal and the principal's agent shall be considered as one (1) defendant when the liability of
such employer or principal has been caused by the wrongful or negligent act or omission of the employee
or agent.
(4) Any defendant held jointly liable under this section shall have a right of contribution against fellow
joint-tortfeasors. A defendant shall be held responsible for contribution to other joint-tortfeasors only for
the percentage of fault assessed to such defendant.
(5) Nothing in this section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently exist,
except as expressly noted herein.
(6) Joint and several liability shall be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common
plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it. Any person held jointly and severally
liable under this section shall have a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert.
(7) In actions involving joint-tortfeasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault for each
party alleged to be at fault.
(8) Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a cause of action. Nothing in this section shall be
construed, in any way, to alter the immunity of any person.
Act of March 2, 1989, ch. 311, 1989 Miss. LAws 19 (codified at Miss. CoDE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1991)).
7. Pearson, supra note 5.
8. Pearson, supra note 5, at 361. See also James B. Stoneking, Beyond Bradley: A Critique of Comparative
Contribution in West Virginia and Proposals for Legislative Reform, 89 W. VA. L. Rev. 167, 170 (1986).
9. Stoneking, supra note 8, at 168.
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some of the problems and inequities associated therewith, the article will suggest
some worthy goals for reform in this area. It will then address joint and several
liability and contribution and discuss the changes in the operation of each resulting
from the passage of section 85-5-7. Finally, this article will attempt to demonstrate
how the doctrine of joint and several liability can be harmonized with the basic
principles of "pure" comparative negligence through the effective use of compara-
tive contribution. For seventy-nine years, Mississippi law has failed to achieve
this objective, and House Bill 1171, which became law in 1989, shows there is
still a long way to go. This comment will provide some direction either by suggest-
ing logical ways in which to interpret the statute or by suggesting further legislative
amendment.
II. PRE-1989 STATUS OF THE LAW IN MISSISSIPPI
A. Development
In order to understand the implications of section 85-5-7, it is appropriate to
begin the analysis with an examination of the background against which the statute
is set. Since the various joint and several liability and contribution rules in Missis-
sippi were originally judicial pronouncements, a good starting point is the English
common law, which is the original wellspring for most of these rules." Prosser
once observed that "joint tort-feasor" was a term that meant "radically different
things to different courts, and often to the same court."11 The confusion apparently
stems from the common law usage of the term "joint tort," which was employed by
the English courts to describe an injury to a plaintiff caused by more than one de-
fendant acting in concert with a common purpose or in cases involving the doc-
trine of respondeat superior where there was dual responsibility for a single act. 2
Although the common law rule as to joinder of parties was very strict, the English
courts allowed defendants in these situations to be joined.13 Because this was a
special situation where all the defendants could be joined, the tort was called a
"joint tort," and the culpable parties were known as "joint tort-feasors."14 The sub-
stantive effect of this type of action was appropriately named "entire liability" be-
10. One of the first cases in Mississippi to discuss joint and several liability referred to the applicable princi-
ples of law as being "universally established" and "well settled." Bailey v. Delta Elec. Light, Power & Mfg. Co.,
38 So. 354, 355 (Miss. 1905). In Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works, 352 So. 2d 1316, 1318
(Miss. 1977), the court's examination of the doctrine of contribution started with an analysis of the English com-
mon law.
11. William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413 (1937).
12. See id., at 414; Roy D. Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REv. 399, 403 (1939).
13. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 414. "Where the defendants did not act in concert, the English courts
refused to allow joinder, even though the defendants had done acts identical in character, which had combined in
their effect to cause a single, more or less indivisible injury to the plaintiff." Id.
14. See Jackson, supra note 12, at 403.
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cause each individual tortfeasor was held liable for the entire damage suffered by
the plaintiff.15
The unfortunate consequence of the procedural and substantive elements being
inextricably entwined became apparent when the common law developed a new
principle of imposing "entire liability" in situations where the actions of one de-
fendant merely concurred with another in producing an injury to a plaintiff.1" Al-
though the defendants were entirely liable, the English courts did not permit
joinder in this situation due to the absence of concerted action.17 Nevertheless, en-
tire liability was imposed "based upon an instinctive feeling that [the] defendant
was morally responsible for the result."' 8 As far as the English courts were con-
cerned, a "joint tort" or "joint tort-feasor" made reference to a situation where the
defendants could be joined (because of concerted action or common duty) and
where each defendant was held liable for total injury to the plaintiff.19 In cases of
concurring negligence, entire liability was not a necessary concomitant thereto
but was only imposed in certain circumstances.
Under the more liberal American rules as to joinder, defendants whose negli-
gence has concurred to produce a single result have been joined in one action, and
have become at once, by careless usage, "joint tort-feasors." One immediate result
has been to confuse joinder of parties with liability for entire damages, and to crys-
tallize the prejudice of the courts against joinder of defendants liable for separate
results. Another has been the rigid enforcement of the rule that a verdict for one sum
15. Id. See Prosser, supm note 11, at 414. Thus, the procedural and substantive elements were coterminous in
the sense that only those tortfeasors who were "entirely" liable on a substantive basis (i.e., concerted action and
the like) could be joined as defendants in the same action. See 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 10.1, at 695 (1956) [hereinafter I HARPER & JAMES].
16. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 418. One treatise refers to this type of action as an "independent concurring
tort" where "a single indivisible harm is sustained as a result of the independent, separate, but concurring tortious
acts of two or more persons." I HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 693.
17. Prosser, supra note 11, at 419.
18. Prosser, supra note 11, at 419. An example was given whereby a defendant left his horse and cart unat-
tended in a street. A passerby whipped the horse, causing it to run over someone. The defendant was liable for the
"entire" damage. See id. at 418-19.
19. One Mississippi case serves as a paradigm of the confusion. In Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co.,
1 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1941), the question was whether a collectible judgment against a negligent servant barred a
subsequent action against the master, who was liable solely because of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at
218. The court stated that the liability of the master and servant is joint and several, "but they are not joint tort-
feasors." Id.
The term "joint tort feasors" means that two or more persons are the joint participants or joint actors,
either by omission or commission, in the wrongful production of an injury to a third person. There the act
or omission of each is his own act or omission, but the acts or omissions are concurrent in, or contribute
to, the production of the wrongful injury, so that each actor is, on his own account, liable for the resulting
damages.
Id. This statement implies that if the negligence of more than one defendant concurs in producing a single injury
to a plaintiff, then the defendants are jointly and severally liable. In light of common law history, the statement is
inaccurate. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. If there is a reasonable basis for apportionment of losses
among wrongdoers whose negligence is concurrent, then imposing entire liability in such an instance is not only
inconsistent with the common law, but is in direct derogation of comparative negligence principles. See infra
notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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must be returned against all those found liable without regard to the fact thatjuries in
separate actions would not be so bound.20
With the liberal rule of joinder in Mississippi, 21 it would be somewhat ridicu-
lous to conclude that entire liability necessarily follows in the concurrent negli-
gence cases. Obviously, the appropriate situations for imposing entire liability are
much narrower than those situations where joinder is permitted. Having cau-
tioned against the possible confusion associated with the term "joint tort-feasor,"
the analysis turns towards looking at those situations where the Mississippi Su-
preme Court has applied the doctrine of joint and several liability.22
B. Application in Mississippi
Joint and several liability has been imposed in Mississippi in five situations: (1)
concerted action; (2) common duty; (3) vicarious liability; (4) concurrent negli-
gence; and (5) alternative liability.
23
1. Concerted Action
Defendants who acted in concert were the most likely to be held jointly and sever-
ally liable at common law. In those cases, there was a common purpose and mu-
tual aid in carrying out the plan, giving the appearance of a joint enterprise.2 4
Thompson v. Johnson21 provides the classic case of concerted action. Defendants
A, B and C went out into their pasture to eject the plaintiff who was there searching
for his cow. While C proceeded to beat the plaintiff severely, A and B held the
plaintiffs wife and mother to prevent them from aiding the plaintiff.26 The court
held that all three men were jointly and severally liable for the injuries inflicted by
C since A and B ensured the beating and maiming of the plaintiff by preventing
others from coming to the plaintiffs aid.27
[T]he rule of joint and several liability of tort feasors prevails where the tort feasors
act in concert or unity of action, and, therefore, applies to tortfeasors who intention-
ally unite in the wrongful act or who are present, assist, or participate therein; and
that where two or more persons engage in a common enterprise, they are jointly lia-
ble for wrongful acts done in connection with that enterprise, at least where the en-
20. Prosser, supra note 10, at 420.
21. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, sever-
ally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all defend-
ants will arise in the action.
Miss. R. Civ. P. 20.
22. Since most of the decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court use the term "joint and several liability," this
comment will follow suit. However, where the term is used in this article, it should be interpreted as being synon-
ymous with "entire" liability.
23. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 697; Prosser, supra note 11, at 441-42 (discussing alter-
native liability).
24. PROssER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 323.
25. 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Mississippi law).
26. Id. at 432-33.
27. Id. at 434.
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terprise is an unlawful one, in which case all are answerable for any injury done by
any one of them, although the damage done was greater than was foreseen or the
particular act was not contemplated or intended by them.28
2. Common Duty
In cases where the defendants were under a common duty of care to a third person,
such as in the case of co-owners of property, each would be jointly and severally
liable for a single injury resulting from a breach of this duty. 29 In Nelson v. Illinois
Central Railroad Co. ,3o the plaintiff lost a suitcase while traveling on a line owned
by Illinois Central.1 Because the plaintiff had also purchased a sleeping car ticket
from the Pullman Company, Illinois Central argued that it was not responsible
since the plaintiffs baggage had been placed in the sole care of Pullman.32 The
court held that both Illinois Central and Pullman were jointly and severally liable
since the respective contracts each had with the plaintiff imposed the same duty of
protection over person and property of the passenger. 33 " '[W]here two or more
owe to another a common duty, and by a common neglect of that duty such other
person is injured, then there is a joint tort, with joint liability.' 31
In Miller v. Phipps,"5 a state revenue agent filed an action against certain mem-
bers of the board of supervisors of Sunflower County, the sureties on their bonds,
and the Bank of Commerce and Trust Company based on conspiracy and fraud. 6
The complaint alleged that the bank had entered into an agreement with the board
of supervisors to purchase bond issues for $34,000 less than their face value.37
The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable since each had a joint
duty to the county.38
3. Vicarious Liability
This category includes situations where the negligence and consequent liability of
one tortfeasor is imputed, through such vehicles as respondeat superior or the fam-
ily purpose doctrine, to one who did not participate in the harm, but who neverthe-
28. Id. at 433-34 (footnotes omitted).
29. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supranote 15,§ 10. l,at 699.
30.53 So. 619 (Miss. 1910).
31. Id. at 620.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 621.
34. Id. (quoting 1 JOHN LEWIS, COOLEY ON THE LAW OF Tors 247 (3d ed. 1906)). "The negligent failure of
both companies to perform their duty to appellant resulted in a single and indivisible injury, for which either or
both are liable. In such a case ... [these] two companies are joint tort-feasors." Id.
35. 137 So. 479 (Miss. 1931).
36. Id. at 480.
37. Id. at 481.
38. Id. at 482. The defendants in this case were cornered because the court not only found ajoint duty, but also
noted that "there was concerted action and joint fraud of the bank and board of supervisors." Id. Thus, joint and
several liability was "inescapable." Id.
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less is charged with the entire result?9 In Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber
Co. ,4 an agent of the lumber company was involved in an automobile collision. 4
The plaintiff brought an action against the agent and obtained a judgment which
was collectible since the agent was solvent.42 Without attempting to collect the
judgment against the agent, the plaintiff filed suit against the lumber company
based on a theory of respondeat superior. 43 With respect to the liability between
principal and agent, the court stated:
[W]hen the liability of a principal for the tort of an agent, or that of the master for the
wrong of a servant, has grown out of a tort in which the agent or servant is the sole
actor, whence the liability of the principal or master is an imputed or constructive
liability and has its sole basis in the doctrine of respondeat superior and in nothing
else, the liability is joint and several, but they are not joint tort feasors."
Regrettably for the plaintiff, the court held that the second action against the
lumber company was barred and essentially stated that the doctrine of respondeat
superior was a two-edged sword.45 Since the liability of the lumber company was
derived solely from the acts of the servant, the court reasoned that such liability
became merged into the judgment recovered against the agent.46 As long as the
judgment was collectible, then there was full satisfaction of the plaintiffs injury,
and no subsequent action against the principal would be allowed.'
4. Alternative Liability
This category is similar to vicarious liability because the negligence of one party is
imputed to another who committed no actionable wrong. Unlike vicarious liabil-
ity, the liability is imputed because the plaintiff has no way of establishing which
of the defendants caused the injury.'
In Oliver v. Miles,49 the plaintiff was walking along a highway adjacent to a field
where Oliver and Shamburger were hunting."o The two fired across the highway at
some birds, and one of the shots struck the plaintiff in the eye.5" The plaintiff was
39. See I HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 699-700; Prosser, supra note 11, at 430. Some argue that
there is not a true "joint tort" involved here because the party held vicariously liable (master, principal, or head of
household) is only made a tortfeasor through the employment of a legal fiction. See I HARPER & JAMES, supra note
15, § 10.1, at 693 n.6. However, in the sense that an injured party may proceed against either or all of the defend-
ants, it is appropriate that this category is considered. Id. at 698 n.35; Prosser, supra note 11, at 430.
40. 1 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1941).
41. Id. at 216-17.
42. Id. at 217.
43. Id. at 217-18.
44. Id. at 218. See also Capital Transp. Co. v. McDuff, 319 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss. 1975).
45. GRANQUIST, 1 So. 2dat 217-18.
46. Id. at 218.
47. Id.
48. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 441-42; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 703 n.69. See also
Harry N. Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and Amplification ofAmerican Mo-
torcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 775, 799 n. 100 (1981).
49. 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1927).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 667.
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not able to determine which of the gunshots inflicted his wound. 2 The lower court
in Oliver instructed the plaintiff that unless he elected to sue one defendant or the
other, a directed verdict would be granted for the defendants . 3 On appeal, the su-
preme court of Mississippi put considerable effort into construing the defendants'
actions as being in concert with each other so as to hold each of them jointly and
severally liable under the more traditional application of the doctrine.5 4 However,
this case does not fit within the concerted action or concurrent negligence catego-
ries because only one of the defendants actually inflicted the injury. Nevertheless,
both defendants acted negligently in firing their guns towards the highway. In a sit-
uation involving two negligent defendants and an innocent plaintiff who is unable
to prove causation, the burden should be shifted to the negligent defendants to
prove which one of them did not cause the injury.55 "To hold otherwise would be to
exonerate both from liability, although each was negligent, and the injury resulted
from such negligence." 6
Courts have had little trouble in consistently holding defendants jointly and sev-
erally liable in the four categories mentioned above. In each of the categories, in-
dependent considerations justified the imposition of joint and several liability."
5. Concurrent Negligence
Concurrent negligence refers to the situation where the independent acts of tort-
feasors concur to produce an injury.8 Concurrent negligence cases can be divided
into three classes: "situations where the acts of a single tort-feasor alone would
have been sufficient to cause (1) the entire damage, (2) none of the damage, (3)
some but not all of the damage."" According to Prosser, the only time that joint
and several liability can be justified with concurrent negligence cases is when
52. Id.
53. Id. "[Tihe plaintiff must plead and prove his case against one or the other, [but] may not join them in the
alternative." Prosser, supra, note 11, at 441.
54. Oliver, 110 So. 2d at 668.
We think that they were jointly engaged in the unlawful enterprise of shooting at birds flying over the
highway; that they were in pursuit of a common purpose; that each did an unlawful act, in the pursuit
thereof; and that each is liable for resulting injury to the boy, although no one can say definitely who actu-
ally shot him.
Id.
55. See also Moore v. Foster, 180 So. 73 (Miss. 1938). In that case, two constables both allegedly shot at a
fleeing defendant. One of the shots struck the defendant in the arm. The lower court instructed the jury that they
should be "convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that John Foster shot and thereby inflicted the injury,
and if not so convinced, it was their sworn duty to return a verdict for defendants." Id. at 74. Citing Oliver, the
court held that the instruction was erroneous and concluded that the two defendants "were acting in a common
purpose in seeking the arrest of the appellant, and each negligently and wrongfully fired at the fleeing appellant.
It has long been settled in this state that joint tort-feasors may be sued jointly or individually, and that liability
may be joint or several." Id.
56. Oliver, 10 So. at 668.
57. For example, principles of respondeat superiorjustify imposing joint and several liability on an employer
and employee because under agency law, the acts of one are imputed to the other. In concerted action cases, both
defendants have essentially conspired to injure the plaintiff.
58. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 588 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash. 1978).
59.1 HARPER & JAmEs, supra note 15, § 10. 1, at 702.
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there is no logical basis for apportioning damages.6 In the first category of cases
where the act of a single tortfeasor would have been sufficient to cause the entire
injury, courts have had no problem in imposing joint and several liability. The
result has been justified on the ground that "the injury is almost always indivisi-
ble. "61 Additionally, the traditional "but for" test of causation has been ineffective
since one could not say that the plaintiffs injury would not have occurred "but for"
either tortfeasor's negligence.62 In reality, the injury would have still occurred un-
der this category notwithstanding the absence of one tortfeasor. As a result, courts
have employed a "substantial contribution" test.63
In State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth,64 the plaintiff brought a case for the
wrongful death of her husband who committed suicide, allegedly as a result of the
intentional abuse of process by two justices of the peace and their deputy sher-
iffs. 61 On three separate occasions, one justice of the peace served criminal war-
rants on Richardson for the collection of checks written without sufficient funds. 66
On the fourth occasion, the other justice of the peace served another criminal
warrant for checks written without sufficient funds which was served upon Ri-
chardson around 1:30 a.m.67 After unsuccessfully attempting to borrow money
from a neighbor, Richardson returned to his home, asked the sheriff to wait while
he got dressed, and proceeded to go to his bedroom where he shot himself.' After
finding that both justices of the peace and their deputy sheriffs were guilty of an
intentional tort (abuse of process), the court held each of them jointly and sever-
ally liable. 69 The court stated that "[w]here two or more causes combine to pro-
duce such a single result, incapable of any logical division, each may be a
substantial factor in bringing about the loss, and if so, each must be charged with
all of it. "
70
In the second category of cases where the acts by the tortfeasors would not have
been sufficient by themselves to cause any of the injury, the large majority ofjuris-
60. Prosser, supra note 11, at 439.
61. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 702. As will be seen, the notion of an injury being indivisible
will run throughout many cases discussed herein. For a recent and insightful criticism of the indivisibility idea in
light of pure comparative negligence principles, see Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 204-05
(Fla. 1987) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
62. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10. 1, at 703.
63. See id.





69. id. at 588.
70. Id. The court was of the opinion that Richardson's death constituted an injury that was incapable of any
logical division. Id. In a wrongful death action such as the one brought here, death is not indivisible because it is
represented by a monetary value. The only element needed in order to divide the injury among the tortfeasors is
the apportionment of fault. Is it beyond the province of the jury to consider whether the actions of the first justice
of the peace (criminal warrant on three occasions) more significantly aggravated the problem? If so, ajury could
simply assign a higher percentage of fault to the first justice of the peace.
19921
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
dictions have imposed joint and several liability.71 Typical situations under this
category are the "collision cases" where the individual act of a tortfeasor, in and of
itself, would not have caused the accident. In Gulf Refining Co. v. Ferrell,72 Tatum,
superintendent of a filling station, instructed Ferrell, his employee, to paint "Don't
Park" signs in the street in front of the property.7 3 Tatum assured Ferrell that he
would watch for any oncoming cars."4 Ferrell was struck by a car and was given no
prior warning by Tatum or the driver of the vehicle.75 The court stated the follow-
ing:
It is too well settled in our jurisprudence to need citation of authorities that the
concurring negligence of two or more persons proximately contributing to an injury
does not constitute independent causes ....
The negligence of [the driver] was a proximate contributing cause, and, together
with the negligence of the master in not warning the servant of the imminent danger,
contributed to the result. Useless each without the other.76
The third category of concurrent negligence is the most troublesome. "Here
some damage would have been done even had some of the defendants not been
negligent, but not as much as was actually sustained. In other words, each wrong-
doer has contributed to produce some harm."77 The confusion in this area is due to
the fact that some cases purport to hold that all acts of concurrent negligence give
rise to joint and several liability while others hold that there is not joint and several
liability where the acts are separate and independent.
In Masonite Corp. v. Burnham,78 a farmer brought suit against Masonite and the
city of Laurel to recover damages for pollution of the Tallahalla creek.79 Laurel
had been using the creek for some time for purposes of dumping sewage. 80 Subse-
quently, Masonite built a plant and began to dump its refuse into the creek.81 The
evidence showed that the activities of the city alone polluted the water and caused
71. See 1 HARPER& JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 705-06. The treatise goes on to explain that the "but for"
test of causation works in this category since" 'but for' each of the defendant's negligence, no harm at all would
have resulted." Id. at 706 (emphasis added). Why should this conclusion preclude apportionment of damages by
a jury?
72. 147 So. 476 (Miss. 1933). This case did not involve the issue of joint and several liability because the
plaintiff had already settled with the other tortfeasor who was driving the vehicle. Thus, the only negligence at
issue in the case is that of Gulf Refining. Had the driver not settled with the plaintiff, the driver and Gulf Refining
would have been joint tortfeasors under Mississippi law. Nevertheless, the discussion of current negligence is




76. Id. at 478. (emphasis added). The decision in D & W Jones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979),
would appear to provide the appropriate standard under this category. See discussion infra notes 104-11 and ac-
companying text.
77.1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 706.
78. 146 So. 292 (Miss. 1933).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 294.
81. Id.
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a stench as well as a breeding ground for mosquitoes.82 However, the evidence also
indicated that Masonite's activities had increased the problem.8 The issue before
the court was whether the two defendants were to be considered joint tortfeasors
so as to make each liable for the whole damage.8 4 The court considered cases from
Ohio, West Virginia, and Florida which held that there was no joint and several
liability where the acts of the tortfeasors were separate and independent with no
concert or collusion among the tortfeasors."s Finding these decisions to be well-
reasoned, the court held that the two defendants were not joint tortfeasors: "There
was no common design between them and no concert of action. The means they
used in the pollution of the stream were entirely different; the pollution by the city
was caused by its sewerage, that of appellant was by the effluent from its fac-
tory.
86
One problem with the Burnham decision is that it did not convincingly distin-
guish Westerfield v. Shell Petroleum Corp.87 This case involved a vehicular colli-
sion where Harrison, who was driving southward, spotted the north-bound Shell
vehicle and attempted to move further to the right of the road in order to give
plenty of room for passing.88 However, Harrison moved the vehicle too close to a
ditch located on the east side of the highway and then had to veer the car sharply to
the left, crossing the center line and causing the collision.89 The passenger of the
Harrison vehicle (Westerfield) brought suit against Harrison and Shell."° Although
Harrison's negligence was established as the proximate cause of the collision at
trial, Harrison argued that had the driver of the Shell vehicle been maintaining a
reasonable speed, the latter could have avoided the collision."1 The court rejected
the argument for two reasons: (1) the Shell driver's negligence was not conclu-
sively established at trial;92 and (2) such a fact would not relieve Harrison of full
responsibility anyway.9"
Such a state of facts would simply mean that appellee and the driver of the Shell car
were joint tort-feasors, and each would be jointly and severally liable for the tort. In
other words, if appellant's injury was caused by the conjoint negligence of appellee




85. Id. at 294-95.
86. Id. at 296.
87. 138 So. 561 (Miss. 1932).
88. Id. at 561.
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this is true, although there was no common duty, common design, or concert of action
between the joint tort-feasors. 4
This statement is dicta since the question of concurrent negligence was not really
before the court. Nevertheless, the holding in Burnham is in direct conflict with
the statement in Westerfield that there could be joint and several liability without
the presence of common duty, common design or concert of action.9"
In Burnham, the court first attempted to distinguish Westerfield on the tenuous
ground that the latter was a personal injury action. 6 The Burnham court then er-
roneously noted that the two defendants in Westerfield were held jointly and sever-
ally liable when, in fact, they were not.97 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to
distinguish the case further by stating that there was "concert of action between
the joint tortfeasors, not by agreement, it is true; each joint tortfeasor was fully
aware of the negligence of the other, and proceeded then and there to contribute to
the injury ... ."" Thus, the distinction being made between the two cases is that
there was no joint and several liability in Burnham because there was no common
design or concert of action between the defendants in producing the injury.99
Whereas in Westerfield, a common design or concert of action was implied from
the circumstances.' 00
Just when there appeared to be some ascertainable standard in these cases, the
Mississippi court made the following comment:
The term "joint tort feasors" means that two or more persons are the joint partici-
pants or joint actors, either by omission or commission, in the wrongful production
of an injury to a third person. There the act or omission of each is his own act or omis-
sion, but the acts or omissions are concurrent in, or contribute to, the production of
94. Id. (emphasis added). In support of its last statement, the court cited Nelson v. Illinois Central R.R., 53
So. 619 (Miss. 1910). That case held that there was joint and several liability where there was a breach of a com-
mon duty. Id. Once again, the court made a broad statement which was unnecessary to the holding of the case
when it stated that the weight of authority also supported the general proposition that" 'when the negligence of
two or more persons concurs in producing a single indivisible injury, then such persons are jointly and severally
liable, although there was no common duty, common design, or concert of action.' "Id. at 621 (quoting 1 JOHN
LEwis, COOLEY ON THE LAw OF ToRTs 247 (3d ed. 1906)) (emphasis added).
95. See Westerfield, 138 So. at 562.
96. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 146 So. 292, 295 (Miss. 1933).
97. Id. at 295 ("The court held that they were both joint tort-feasors and jointly and severally liable."). How-
ever, the court in Westerfield never accepted the fact that the driver of the Shell vehicle was negligent along with
the other driver (Harrison). The discussion concerning concurrent negligence was simply to illustrate the futile
nature of Harrison's attempt to show the other driver's negligence. "The fact [negligence of Shell vehicle], if it
were affact. . .would simply mean that appellee and the driver of the Shell car were joint tort-feasors, and each
would be jointly and severally liable for the tort." Westerfield, 138 So. at 562 (emphasis added).
98. Burnham, 146 So. at 295-96.
99. See Prosser, supra note 11, at 425 (noting that English courts did not permit joinder in any other situa-
tion).
100. To say that there is "concert of action" in the case of an automobile collision is to substantially distort the
meaning of the term. Concert of action implies that there has been action by the tortfeasors pursuant to a common
plan. How can it be said that the collision in Westerfield was in accordance with some plan between the defend-
ants? The argument goes too far. There is no way that the action in that case was concerted in the traditional sense
when the collision was caused by one of the drivers veering suddenly and sharply to the left in order to avoid
plunging into a ditch. See Westerfield, 138 So. at 561-62 (Miss. 1932).
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the wrongful injury, so that each actor is, on his own account, liable for the resulting
damages.
10 1
This statement leaves the holding in Burnham in peril because the actions of the
two defendants in that case certainly fit into the broad definition ofjoint tortfeasor
provided above. Later, the court seemed to propose another standard in Hutto v.
Kremer,"0 2 where it stated," 'all who actively participate in any manner in the com-
mission of a tort, or who command, direct, advise, encourage, aid or abet its com-
mission, are jointly and severally liable therefor.' "103
In a more recent case, the court again addressed the appropriate standard for
imposing joint and several liability in this category of concurrent negligence cases.
In D & WJones, Inc. v. Collier,"0 4 several catfish farmers brought an action for
damages against farmers and crop dusters for the contamination and killing of
their catfish.105 Numerous farmers in the Delta aerially applied the chemical Tox-
aphene to crops such as cotton and soybeans. 6 Unfortunately, the chemical was
highly toxic to aquatic life, particularly fish.0 7 The catfish farmers claimed that
the defendants were jointly and severally liable.' 08 The defendants argued that un-
der Burnham, there were not any joint tortfeasors in this case because there was no
concert of action on the part of the defendants.' 09 Faced with the conflicting deci-
sions of Burnham and Westerfield, the court expressed doubt as to the distinction
which was made in Burnham between damages for a tort involving injury to the
person and one involving injury to property."0 Nevertheless, it seized upon the
"implied concerted action" of Westerfield in order to hold the defendants jointly and
severally liable."' Although the court attempted to distinguish Burnham in form,
the actual result is that it overruled that case in substance:
Turning to the modern trend where joint and several liability may exist, notwith-
standing lack of concerted action on the part of the tort-feasors, and enlarging upon
the principle stated in Westerfield v. Shell Petroleum Corporation ... we hold that the
separate, concurrent and successive negligent acts of the appellees which combined to
proximately produce the single, indivisible injury to appellant' property ... rendered
appellees jointly and severally liable. 1
2
101. Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co., I So. 2d 216, 218 (Miss. 1941) (emphasis added).
102. 76 So. 2d 204 (Miss. 1954).
103. Id. at 208 (quoting 1 D. AVERY HAGGARD, COOLEY ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 85 (4th ed. 1932)) (emphasis
added). In Kremer, Hutto executed a deed of trust to Brooks, but negligently misrepresented the boundary line to
the property. Id. at 206. As a result, Brooks crossed over onto Kremer's land and proceeded to cut trees located
there. Id. The court held both Brooks and Hutto jointly and severally liable for the damage done. Id. at 208.
104. 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 289.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 290.
109. Id. at 291.
110. Id.
I11.Id. at 294.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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Burnham is essentially overruled because that case adopted the view of numerous
cases which held that several separate and independent acts of tortfeasors do not
render them jointly and severally liable in the absence of concerted action. 113 To
say that there was any more "implied concerted action" in D & WJones, Inc. v.
Collier than there was in Burnham is simply to create a distinction without any sig-
nificant difference.
A more recent pronouncement by the Mississippi Supreme Court in this area is
Hall v. Hilbun.114 In that case, the plaintiff underwent surgery for obstruction of
the small bowel.1" After the surgery, Hall was in considerable pain and was hav-
ing trouble breathing. 116 The nursing staff at the hospital was informed numerous
times, but Dr. Hilbun was never contacted. 117 Finally after Hall's husband noticed
bluish discoloration, he again informed the nurses who in turn called Dr.
Hilbun. 118 By the time the doctor had reached the hospital, Mrs. Hall had died.119
During the course of the trial, Hilbun emphasized the inadequacy of the nursing
and personnel resources at the hospital. 2 ' In response, the court stated that Hilbun
was only increasing his own culpability: "Where a physician is working with med-
ical personnel of known modest competence, his duty of instruction and control is
increased." '21
[l]t appears that Dr. Hilbun's failures in the area of post-operative care were not so
substantial as the nurses' failures. Under established law, however, if Dr. Hilbun
breached the duty of care he owed to Mrs. Hall and ifsuch breach, ifany, was aprox-
imate cause of Mrs. Hall's death, plaintiff may recover full damages of and from Dr.
Hilbun, notwithstanding that others may have been more at fault and that their fault
was the more substantial factor causing Mrs. Hall's death. This case falls within the
settled rule that joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff who,
at his election, may sue fewer than all and recover full damages from those sued. 
122
As can be seen from the discussion of the foregoing cases, the standard for im-
posing joint and several liability has been anything but consistent. If Collier did
not overrule Burnham, it certainly left it with no teeth. The only finding needed to
circumvent the holding in Burnham is implied concerted action, a concept which
has been troubling since its creation. As will be discussed below, section 85-5-7 of
the Mississippi Code fortunately relieves some of the ambiguity in this area.
113. See Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 146 So. 292, 295 (Miss. 1933).
114. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
115. Id. at 860.
116. Id, at 860-61.
117. Id, at 861.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 878.
121. Id. at 879.
122. Id. at 879 n. 15 (emphasis added).
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C. Consequences of Joint & Several Liability
Having discussed the situations in which joint and several liability will be im-
posed, the consequences that follow are relatively straightforward. Assume that
plaintiff A has suffered $100,000 in damages as a result of the actions of B and C.
B was 20% at fault while C, who had only $40,000 in assets, was 80% at fault.
Perhaps the most important consequence of joint and several liability is that A can
sue both B and Cor sue only one of them and recover full damages.123 IfA chooses
to sue C, A is not barred from bringing a separate action against B. "[W]here an
injury is produced by joint tort-feasors, 'the party injured may bring separate suits
against the wrongdoers, and proceed to judgment in each, and. . . no bar arises as
to any of them until satisfaction is received.' "24 As the previous statement im-
plies, A can sue any or all of the tortfeasors, but A is entitled to only one satisfac-
tion of his or her injury. 2' Thus, if A recovers all of the $100,000 from B, no
further action based on that injury will be permitted against C.126
Under comparative negligence, the jury's function in assigning percentages of
fault to each of the parties in almost every case is considered a "logical basis."' 27
From this perspective, it may be the rare case where the jury is plainly ineffective
in assigning percentages of fault. Nevertheless, the confusion associated with join-
der of parties and entire liability,'28 as well as with the notion of an "indivisible
injury," has been an unfortunate characteristic of Mississippi case law for quite
some time. 29 The net result of these cases has been twofold: (1) the imposition of
joint and several liability notwithstanding the existence of a logical basis for appor-
123. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 879 n.15 (Miss. 1985); Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So. 2d 87, 89
(Miss. 1967); Junkins v. Brown, 117 So. 2d 712, 715 (Miss. 1960); Miller v. Phipps, 137 So. 479, 482 (Miss.
1931); Bailey v. Delta Elec. Light, Power & Mfg. Co., 38 So. 354, 355 (Miss. 1905); see also Ramsey v. Geor-
gia-Pacific Corp., 597 F.2d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Mississippi law).
124. Nelson v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 53 So. 619, 621-22 (Miss. 1910) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ToaRs 159 (2d ed. 1888)). See Sawmill Constr. Co. v. Bright, 77 So. 316 (Miss. 1918)
(plaintiff who sued one tortfeasor that turned out to be bankrupt was not precluded from bringing suit against the
other tortfeasor); see also Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666, 667 (Miss. 1927) (one joint tortfeasor not relieved of
liability by suit or judgment against other tortfeasors).
125. See Sawmill Constr. Co. v. Bright, 77 So. 316, 317 (Miss. 1918); Nelson v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 53
So. 619, 622 (Miss. 1910); Bailey v. Delta Elec. Light, Power& Mfg. Co., 38 So. 354, 355 (Miss. 1905).
126. Cf Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co., I So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1941). The court stated that a principal
and agent were jointly and severally liable for the injuries caused by the agent. Id. at 218. The plaintiff in this case
sued the agent and obtained a valid and collectible judgment, but did not act on collecting it. Id. Instead, the
plaintiff brought another action against the principal. Id. The court stated that as long as the plaintiff had a col-
lectible judgment for his entire injury, then the wrong was deemed to be legally satisfied, and no subsequent
action would be allowed. Id.
127. Gary B. Brewer, Comment, Where is the Principle of Fairness in Joint and Several Liability -Missouri
Stops Short of a Comprehensive Comparative Fault System? 50 Mo. L. REv. 601,617 (1985).
128. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
129. Bailey v. Delta Elec. Light, Power & Mfg. Co., 38 So. 354 (Miss. 1905), was probably the first concur-
rent negligence case. Although the case does not state how Bailey was injured, it did hold that there was concur-
rent negligence between the two tortfeasors. Id. at 355. Bailey's employer, Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph,
was "actively" negligent in failing to provide a safe place to work, while Delta Electric was "passively" negligent
for the negligent acts of its employees. Id. Imposing joint and several liability in this situation is justified only by
the fact that the court could not rely on comparative negligence because the statute recognizing comparative fault
was not enacted until 1910. Today, however, joint and several liability would be unnecessary, and this would be
an ideal case for the jury to be called upon to apportion damages.
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tionment, and (2) lack of any ascertainable standard by which to determine which
concurrent tortfeasors should be held jointly and severally liable.
Implicit in the notion ofjoint and several liability is the idea that there can be no
apportionment of damages among tortfeasors.130 Likewise, a jury can return only
one verdict for a single amount against multiple tortfeasors. 131 In Mississippi Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. Roberts,132 a school bus was struck by a train while attempting
to cross the tracks.133 The jury returned two verdicts, one against the railroad
company for $8,500 and another against the bus driver for $1,000.1" Apparently,
the jury was under the impression that the railroad company was more to blame
for the collision than the bus driver and thus attempted to apportion the fault ac-
cordingly. The lower court sent the jury back with instructions that only one ver-
dict could be entered against both defendants.13 On appeal, the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed and held that the lower court had followed the correct
procedure. 136
In Meridian City Lines, Inc. v. Baker,137 the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff finding each defendant liable for $3,500, or a total of $7,000.138 Once again,
the lower court sent the jury back to deliberate and come up with one verdict to be
entered against all defendants found liable. 139 Not to be outdone, thejury exhibited
more ingenuity and returned a verdict "for the plaintiff as against Meridian City
Lines, Inc., and City of Meridian, defendants, and assess his damages at $7,000
($3500 each)."14 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the jury had nevertheless ap-
portioned damages in its verdict.141 The court disagreed and explained that "while
the jury found more than was necessary in adding to their verdict '($3500 each),'
this does not vitiate that which was well found by the jury and it may be disre-
garded and treated as surplusage."
1 42
130. See Nason v. Sanders, 227 So. 2d 275, 277 (Miss. 1969); Saucier v. Walker, 203 So. 2d 299, 303 (Miss.
1967); Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 50 So. 2d 572, 577 (Miss. 1951); Meridian City Lines, Inc. v.
Baker, 39 So. 2d 541, 542 (Miss. 1949); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Pope, 166 So. 539, 541 (Miss. 1936); Mississippi
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Roberts, 160 So. 604, 607 (Miss. 1935).
131. This does not mean the jury must return a verdict against all defendants who are alleged to be tortfeasors.
In Saucier v. Walker, 203 So. 2d 299 (Miss. 1967), the plaintiff sued six defendants for injuries arising out of an
automobile collision. The jury returned a verdict against four of the defendants holding each liable for $5,000.
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and held that separate verdicts could not be entered against
each of the four defendants, it also held that it was proper for the jury to exclude the remaining two defendants if it
found them to be not liable. Id. at 302-03.
132. 160 So. 604 (Miss. 1935).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 606.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 607. The parties in the case also argued that the statute authorized the jury to return separate verdicts
against several defendants. Id. The court responded by stating that the statute was procedural only. Id. "In order to
receive several verdicts under that statute, the substantive law controlling the case must be such as to impose
several separable and different respective liabilities, which is not the case here." Id.
137. 39 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1949).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 542.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 543.
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Another implication of being held jointly and severally liable as a defendant was
that there was no right of contribution. The doctrine of contribution simply states
that "persons having a common liability . . . bear their individual share of the
burden imposed." 1" Although this was the general rule at common law, an excep-
tion was made in the case of defendants who were held jointly and severally lia-
ble. 144 In our joint tortfeasor hypothetical, this meant that if A sued B and
recovered $100,000, B would have no avenue of recourse against C whatso-
ever. 145 For many years, the courts in Mississippi adhered to this view.
146
When the Mississippi Legislature enacted this state's first contribution statute
in 1952,147 its effect was to create a right of contribution for a joint tortfeasor who
had paid the entire judgment which did not exist before." Unfortunately, the
rights that the statute created were very limited in terms of application. Three pre-
requisites had to be met for a right of contribution to exist between joint tort-
feasors.' 49 First, the plaintiff had to sue the joint tortfeasors together in one
action.15 1 In our hypothetical, if the plaintiff chose to sue only B, then the statute
would never come into operation since this would not be an action where judg-
ment could be rendered "against two (2) or more defendants. 151 Second, there had
143. Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Miss. 1977).
144. The rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors originated in the famous case of Merryweather
v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) (cited in Celotex, 352 So. 2d at 1318). Since both defendants were
joined in the case, they must have acted in concert in producing the injury (since English courts did not permit
joinder in any other situation). See Prosser, supra note 11, at 425. The logic behind the decision appears to be
that where defendants voluntarily participate in the wrongful act, as opposed to merely being negligent, contribu-
tion would not be permitted. Id. at 426.
145. This statement should be qualified since the doctrine of indemnity could apply. While contribution re-
quires the re-apportionment of losses among tortfeasors by requiring each to pay a proportionate share (either
based on pro-rata or percentage of fault), indemnity requires one to reimburse the other in full. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 1, § 51, at 341. Whereas contribution arises due to a common liability among tortfeasors,
indemnity is based on a difference between the primary and secondary liability of two persons. See Hood v. Deal-
ers Transport Co., 472 F. Supp. 250,253 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (quoting Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 501 F.2d 94, 102 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974)). The obligation to indemnify can arise from a contractual relation,
implied contractual relation, or liability imposed by law (respondeat superior). See Bush v. City of Laurel, 215
So. 2d 256, 259 (Miss. 1968). In order to recover under an implied indemnity theory, one must show that (1) the
damages sought to be shifted are imposed as a result of some legal obligation, and (2) that the claimant did not
actively participate in the wrong (i.e., must show "passive negligence"). See Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Al-
lied Chem. Corp., 501 F2d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Atlas Tank Mfg. Co., 230 So.
2d 549, 551 (Miss. 1970)). For a good discussion of the doctrine of indemnity in Mississippi, see Thomas M.
Murphree, Comment, Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 43 Miss. L.J. 670 (1972). If any of these three rela-
tionships giving rise to indemnity is missing, the tortfeasor truly has no further recourse when held jointly and
severally liable.
146. See Klaas v. Continental S. Lines, 82 So. 2d 705, 707 (Miss. 1955); Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber
Co., I So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1941); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Pope, 166 So. 539 (Miss. 1936); Mississippi Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Roberts, 160 So. 604, 607 (Miss. 1935); Thomas v. Rounds, 137 So. 894, 894 (Miss. 1931); see also
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Mississippi Export R.R. Co., 91 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1937) (applying Missis-
sippi law).
147. Act of April 15, 1952, ch. 259, 1952 Miss. LAws 288.
148. Klaas v. Continental S. Lines, 82 So. 2d 705, 707 (Miss. 1955).
149. Miss. COoE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (repealed 1989).
150. McClellan v. Poole, 692 F. Supp. 687, 688-89 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
151. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (repealed 1989).
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to be a "joint" judgment rendered against the tortfeasors.1 52 This is not merely a
restatement of the first requirement because A could choose to sue both C and B,
but the jury could come back with a verdict against only one of them.1 13 In that
situation, the tortfeasor held liable for the damage would not be entitled to contri-
bution since a judgment was not rendered against two or more defendants
"jointly."" 4 Third, one of the joint tortfeasors must have paid more than his or her
share of the judgment.1 5 Under the 1952 legislation, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that apportionment of one's share of a judgment was to be made on a
pro-rata basis.156 Although B and C were respectively allotted 20% and 80% of
the fault in the hypothetical, their "share" of the judgment for contribution pur-
poses would be $50,000 each -without any regard to fault apportionment. Unless
one of the tortfeasors had paid more than his or her pro-rata share of thejudgment,
there would be no right of contribution. 5 7
D. So What's the Matter Here?
In 1910, Mississippi became the first state to adopt a "pure" form of compara-
tive negligence."5 8 Unlike Mississippi, other states which have judicially adopted
pure comparative negligence have had the luxury of having their highest courts ex-
plain why comparative negligence would be a better alternative than contributory
negligence. 5 9 Inevitably, any proffered justification of comparative negligence
over contributory negligence focuses in on the concept of fairness. 160 In the final
analysis, the plaintiffs own fault should not totally bar the recovery. Pure compar-
ative negligence is preferred over the "all or nothing" approach of contributory
negligence because the former assigns responsibility for damage in direct propor-
152. McClellan v. Poole, 692 F Supp. at 688-89. See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Mitchell Buick-
Pontiac & Equip. Co., 479 F Supp. 345, 348 (N.D. Miss. 1979); Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 472 F Supp.
250, 254 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
153. This is merely another way of stating the obvious conclusion that simply because the plaintiff sues every
possible tortfeasor does not necessarily mean that the jury will find each one to be responsible. See supra note 131
and accompanying text.
154. McClellan v. Poole, 692 F Supp. at 688-89.
155. Id. at 689. See also Klaas v. Continental S. Lines, 82 So. 2d 705, 707 (Miss. 1955).
156. See Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofimg & Metal Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Miss. 1977). The
statute provided that "if one (1) of such defendants pays an amount greater than the total sum of the judgment
divided by the number of defendants against whom the judgment was rendered" then that defendant would have a
right of contribution. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (repealed 1989). Thus, the conclusion was almost ines-
capable that division should be on a pro-rata basis.
157. If a tortfeasor had paid more than his or her pro-rata share of the judgment, then the other party defend-
ants were jointly and severally liable to the first tortfeasor for the excess amount paid. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5
(1972) (repealed 1989).
158. See supr part I.
159. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. 1977); see also John G.
Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated
with American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1464, 1467 n.3 (1979).
160. See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 127, at 619; H. Anthony Miller, Extending the Fairness Principle of Li and
American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform Comparative FaultAct, 14 PAc. L.J. 835, 845 (1983); Zavos, su-
pra note 48, at 777 n.8; see also Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Wash.
1978) ("Comparative negligence represents an attempt to achieve greater fairness in tort law.").
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tion to the negligence of each party.161 Any method of apportioning fault which ig-
nores the respective percentages of responsibility, without a significant
consideration justifying the displacement," 2 is inconsistent with pure comparative
negligence principles. If taken to its most logical conclusion, two deductions can
be made from a system of "pure" comparative negligence: "(1) a person causing
loss to himself by his own negligence cannot recover that portion of his loss that
equals his share of the negligence, and; (2) a person causing loss to another by his
negligence is liable according to his share of the negligence." '163
In the ideal situation, all defendants are solvent and able to pay a proportionate
part of the liability.164 Thus, if a state has a system of several liability, no one can
complain because each tortfeasor would pay his or her respective share, and the
plaintiff would be fully compensated. The result would be the same under joint
and several liability, assuming that the jurisdiction had a right of contribution in
favor of tortfeasors based on proportionate fault. This way, if the plaintiff sued
B10% and C90% and B paid the full $100,000 judgment, B10% could proceed to
bring a contribution suit against C90% to recover $90,000. At this stage of the
analysis, many writers have commented that the world is far from perfect, since
so many tortfeasors are insolvent. 6 Before reaching the question of insolvent tort-
feasors, however, it must be noted that Mississippi's method of loss apportion-
ment in the multiple tortfeasor context was patently unfair even assuming that all
defendants were solvent.
In Mississippi, joint and several liability has been the method of loss apportion-
ment between the plaintiff and the multiple tortfeasors. Although pure compara-
tive negligence was adopted in 1910, it was not until 1952 that tortfeasors gained
the right, albeit a limited one, to obtain contribution to re-apportion the liability
among themselves. Thus before 1952, the plaintiff could sue B10%, recover
$100,000, and B had no further recourse. 166 After 1952, if the plaintiff sued only
B10%, then the latter would still have no recourse since this was not a situation
161. See Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (considering various arguments in favor of a
comparative system).
162. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
163. Pearson, supra note 5, at 363. The second proposition will not always be the case in a "modified" state.
For instance, if a state follows the 51 % fault bar system, then a plaintiff is only allowed to recover if his or her
negligence is equal to or less than that of the defendant. See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 473. Thus,
there will be cases where a defendant will not be liable to the plaintiff for the proportion of negligence attributable
to him. Pearson also suggests that these two statements give rise to a third principle which supposes "that a per-
son's share of the negligence should not only determine the extent of his liability, but the limit as well." Pearson,
supra note 5, at 363. Insofar as this suggests that "several" liability is the result dictated by pure comparative neg-
ligence principles, it is misleading and inaccurate. See discussion infra part IV.B. 1.
164. See Zavos, supra note 48, at 780.
165. See id. at 780-81; Brewer, supra note 127, at 605.
166. This was the case except for the limited situations where a court would allow indemnity. The more per-
plexing question is why apportionment of fault is permitted between the plaintiff and defendant but not among
multiple defendants vis-a-vis themselves. "It would appear reasonable and logical that if the jury can apportion
between the main parties, they should be able to apportion their verdict according to the degree of negligence of
the several defendants." Nason v. Sanders, 227 So. 2d 275, 277 (Miss. 1969).
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where a joint judgment could have been rendered.' 7 C90% could have sufficient
assets to satisfy ninety percent of the judgment and it would not make any differ-
ence.
One possible improvement was suggested by Dean John W. Wade twenty-five
years ago. Observing Mississippi's contribution statute, Dean Wade described it
as follows:
[I]t is quite inadequate and applies only in the case where the original plaintiff has
obtained a judgment against both of the tortfeasors. This would seem to mean that
he still has the entire choice as to whether he would sue either or both parties, and if
he failed to join one of them the statute would not come into operation. If Mississippi
had a third-party practice, then perhaps one defendant could join another and make
the statute effective. In the absence of such a practice the present statute is very in-
adequate.'16
At that time, Mississippi did not have third-party practice; now, Rule 14 of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides for such practice.1 6 9 Even so, Rule
14 is useless to a joint tortfeasor who does not have a substantive right of contribu-
tion.1 70 The comment to Rule 14 explains it as follows:
It is essential that the third-party claim be for some form of derivative or secondary
liability of the third-party defendant to the third-party plaintiff. . . . It is not availa-
ble, for example, to bring in a party solely on the ground that he is or may be liable to
the original plaintiff. Thus, an allegation that the third party is a joint tortfeasor or is
the one really liable to the original plaintiff is insufficient to state a third-party claim.
The requirement that the third-party claim be for derivative or secondary liability
may be met by, for example, an allegation of a right of indemnity (contractual or oth-
erwise), contribution, subrogation, or warranty. The rule does not, however, create
any such rights. . . . Thus, since Mississippi does not recognize a right of contribu-
tion for joint tortfeasors, Rule 14 will not, in general, permit impleader of a joint tort-
feasor. 
171
Without a substantive right of contribution, the only "fair" aspect of the system is
that it is "fairly" one-sided in favor of the plaintiff. Certainly, fairness must be
predicated on more than just the fortuitous happenstance of a defendant's solvency
or a plaintiffs whim.
1 72
167. See discussion supra part II. C.
168. John W. Wade, Some Recent Changes in the Law of Torts, Address Before the Mississippi State Bar (July 1,
1967), in 38 Miss. L.J. 565,574 (1967).
169. Miss. R. Civ. P. 14.
170. John W. Wade, Multiple TortfeasorLiability in Products Liability Suits, 55 Miss. L.J. 683,688 n.20 (1985)
(joint tortfeasor's right to implead another party "for the purpose of asserting a right of contribution depends upon
the existence of two statutes, a substantive one bestowing the right of contribution ... and a procedural one per-
mitting the defendant to implead a third party.").
171. Miss. R. Civ. P. 14 cmt. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
172. See Miller, supra note 160, at 845. The rule has also come under sharp criticism from some members of
the Mississippi Supreme Court: "It seems clear to me that the same logic and sense of justice which led this state
to reject the common law contributory negligence rule should also cause us, albeit at this late date, to abandon the
common law rule prohibiting a right of contribution among joint tort-feasors." Wilson v. Giordano Ins. Agency,
Inc., 475 So. 2d 414,420 (Miss. 1985) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
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Another problem was that Mississippi's statute provided for contribution on a
pro-rata basis. In our example, if A sued both B10% and C90% in the same action
and a $100,000 joint judgment was rendered against each, A could collect the total
from either one. Assuming that B paid the entire judgment, B could bring an
action for contribution against C. Since contribution was apportioned on a pro-
rata basis, each tortfeasor would be liable for $50,000 each ($100,000 divided by
the number of defendants). Thus, B10% could recover only $50,000 in a contri-
bution suit against C since that is all for which C was liable. In terms of percent-
ages of responsibility, B ended up paying $40,000 that was attributable to Cs
negligence. Fair?
While the goal of any pure comparative negligence system ought to promote full
recovery by injured plaintiffs, the system also mandates the allocation of liability
according to the proportionate responsibility of the culpable parties.'7 A step in
the right direction would begin with the elimination of any archaic and baseless
barriers to contribution. As long as such barriers remain, comparative negligence
will not be able to accomplish its purpose of apportioning damages according to
percentages of fault. 74 With this perspective in mind, the analysis can turn to-
wards the Mississippi Legislature's efforts to remedy the situation.
III. SCOPE OF NEW LEGISLATION
One of the first things to understand about section 85-5-7 is that it only applies
to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1989. ' Therefore, any action ac-
cruing before this date is still subject to theold rules discussed above.
Section 85-5-7 purports to apply to "any civil action based on fault." 7 ' As used
in subsection (1), "fault" is defined very broadly as "an act or omission of a person
which is a proximate cause" of some sort of damage.' 77 The damage can be injury
or death to another person, property damage, or economic injury.178 In order to
determine the scope of the statute, it is necessary to examine subsections (2) and
(3) together. Both provide that the statute will apply to civil actions where the lia-
bility for damages has been caused by two or more "persons."7 7 Throughout the
text of the statute, the legislature interchangeably used the terms "person," "joint
tort-feasor," "defendant," and "party." 80 By stating that the modifications in sec-
173. See Brewer, supra note 127, at 619 (compensation must be tempered by a sense of fairness and logic);
Thomas V. Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort Reform Act: Partial Tort Settlements After the Demise of Joint and Sev-
eralLiability, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 67, 72 (1987); William J. McNichols, Judicial Elimination of Joint and Several
Liability Because of Comparative Negligence -A Puzzling Choice, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 11 (1979) (comparative
negligence should insure adequate compensation and provide fair allocation of responsibility among wrongdo-
ers).
174. See SCHwARrz, supra note 3, § 16.7, at 273.
175. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1991).
176. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(2)-(3) (1991).
177. Miss. CooE ANN. § 85-5-7(1) (1991). "Fault" includes, but is not limited to "negligence, malpractice,
strict liability, absolute liability or failure to warn." Id.
178. Id.
179. Miss. ConE ANN. § 85-5-7(2)-(3) (1991).
180. Id.
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tion 85-5-7 are applicable where liability has been caused by two or more persons,
the legislature has left open a significant question of applicability.
Under prior law, a plaintiff could defeat the operation of the contribution stat-
ute - not to imply that a plaintiff would gain anything from doing so - by not suing
all defendants in one action. 181 Under the new legislation, it is doubtful whether
the plaintiff could circumvent the operation of the statute with such a maneuver.
For instance, if both B and C caused injury to A, and A only sued B, the statute
would purportedly apply since this would be a civil action based on fault where the
liability for damages was caused by two or more persons .82
In terms of concurrent negligence cases, the language does not purport to limit
the statute to situations where there is no reasonable basis for apportioning fault.
Instead, it would seem to apply in all concurrent negligence cases.' 8 In reference
to the other four categories mentioned earlier,1" the legislation excludes concerted
action and vicarious liability, while it applies to alternative liability and common
duty cases. The net effect of the statute is that it changes the consequences of being
held jointly and severally liable in this state.
As to concerted action cases, the legislative mandate is that traditional joint and
several liability will be "imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a
common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it.' 18 In
this sense, "traditional" means that a plaintiff will be able to sue one or all of the
joint tortfeasors who act in concert and recover full damages from any one of
them. 18 As to vicarious liability cases, subsection (3) retains the same language as
former section 85-5-5187 and essentially states that employer-employee and princi-
pal-agent relationships shall be considered as one defendant for purposes of assess-
ing percentages of fault.' 88 Thus, if the plaintiff is injured by A, who is an
employee of B, the statute does not apply because the liability for damages has not
been caused by two or more persons since A and B are considered to be one de-
fendant under subsection (3). 189 The statute appears to include common duty cases
181. "The statute applies only '[i]n any action for damages where judgment is rendered against two (2), or more
defendants, jointly and severally as joint tort feasors.' Here, defendant as a tortfeasor has been sued alone. Under
such circumstances the section does not apply." Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 472 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. Miss.
1979) (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (repealed and replaced by Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1991)).
"This permits the plaintiff to make his own selection and, insofar as he exercises it, the policy of the statute may
be defeated." I HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, § 10.2, at 720.
182. If the language were "liability for damages caused by two (2) or more 'parties' or 'defendants,' "then the
plaintiff could circumvent the operation of the statute by bringing an action against only one of them.
183. In terms of reform, the scope of the statute is appropriate since most, if not all, of the Mississippi Supreme
Court decisions involving concurrent negligence have held the defendants jointly and severally liable, notwith-
standing the existence of any reasonable basis for apportioning damages.
184. See discussion supra part 11.B. 1-4.
185. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(6) (1991). Therefore, the result reached in Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d
431 (5th Cir. 1950), has not been changed by the statute. See discussion supra part .B. 1.
186. In terms of liability for damages, the result is the same as it was in the concerted action cases. One impor-
tant difference is that these "concerted action" defendants now have a right of contribution from their fellow de-
fendants. See discussion infra part V.
187. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972) (repealed 1989).
188. See Miss. CoDE ANN. § 85-5-7(3) (1991).
189. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(2)-(3) (1991).
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because the definition of fault in subsection (1) is sufficiently broad to do so, and
the exclusions from the statute in subsection (6) do not cover this situation. Inter-
estingly, the definition of fault in subsection (1) does not include intentional
torts.190 Thus, cases such as State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth9' are not within
the purview of the statute, and traditional principles of joint and several liability
will apply.
Another topic which needs to be addressed is the statute's application to absent
tortfeasors. Consider the following situation: There are three cars, A, B and C,
following one another in a row. A, who happens to be the lead car, signals for a
right turn and proceeds to pull into a gas station, then suddenly decides to pull back
onto the street. B slams on his brakes to avoid the collision, but C, who was follow-
ing B, skids into the back of B. A, who did not stop at the scene is unknown at the
time B brings an action against C. "2 The question is whether the negligence of the
absent tortfeasor A should be considered by the jury in Bs action against C. Note
that the problem of absent tortfeasors can arise in other circumstances such as
where the plaintiff decides not to join one or more of the tortfeasors, or where the
tortfeasor may be unavailable for joinder (tortfeasor is dead, outside jurisdictional
reach of the court, or has statutory immunity). 93
Under the new legislation, subsection (7) provides that "[iun actions involving
joint tort-feasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of faultfor each
party alleged to be at fault."94 The language is definitely susceptible to two inter-
pretations. The first is that the word "party" is used in a broad sense to encompass
all persons whose negligence contributed to the accident. 19' Some of the consider-
ations that favor considering an absent tortfeasor's negligence include: "(1) com-
parative negligence was designed to allocate negligence among the parties at fault
and not just the parties to the lawsuit"; 9 ' (2) such consideration tends to ensure
that all claims are decided in one lawsuit and avoids multiplicity of litigation;' 97
and (3) if an absent tortfeasor is not considered, then the "defendant runs the risk
of bearing the entire financial burden of plaintiffs misfortune when he may only
be slightly negligent for causing injury when his negligence is compared to the to-
tal negligence of all parties."199
190. "Fault' shall not include any tort which results from an act or omission committed with a specific wrong-
ful intent." Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(1) (1991).
191. 214 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1968) (discussed supra part II.B.5).
192. The facts of this case are based on Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 580 (N.M.
App. 1982).
193. Nancy Thofner, Note, The Modification of Joint and Several Liability: Consideration of the Uniform Com-
parativeFaultAct, 36 U. FLA. L. Rav. 288, 303 (1984).
194. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(7) (1991) (emphasis added).
195. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899,906 n.2 (Cal. 1978); Blocker v. Wynn,
425 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 876 (Kan. 1978); Lines v. Ryan,
272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978); Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980); Bowman v. Barnes,
282 S.E.2d 613, 620-21 (W. Va. 1981).
196. National Farmers Union Property v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Colo. 1983).
197. Id. at 1060.
198. Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980).
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The other view is that the absent tortfeasor's negligence should not be consid-
ered. Considerations in favor of this view include: (1) it is unfair to the plaintiff to
consider the absent tortfeasor because it forces the plaintiff to prove negligence on
the part of the defendant while also having to prove the non-negligence of absent
tortfeasors;199 (2) any responsibility which would be allocated to such an absent
tortfeasor would not be binding since the absent tortfeasor was not a party to the
action;2 °. and (3) "party" is not synonymous with "person."
The problem with subsection (7) is that it uses the term "party." This is the first
and only time that the term appears in the statute. Had the legislature employed
one of the previously used terms such as "defendant" or "person," the answer may
have been more clear. Strictly speaking, one could interpret "parties" to mean just
what it says. That would limit the apportionment tojust those defendants the plain-
tiff decided to bring into the action. However, by including absent tortfeasors
within the meaning of "parties," a court may be better able to effectuate the com-
parative negligence function by considering all parties whose negligence contrib-
uted to the injury. If the defendant does have a substantive right to contribution
under the new legislation, this may be an effective way to balance the unfairness to
the defendant associated with the plaintiffs ability to choose the parties to the
action.
Notably, one significant area which is not covered by section 85-5-7 is where
one or more tortfeasors is released from liability through a covenant not to sue or a
settlement agreement. Assume that P was injured by the concurrent negligence of
B, C and D. Ps damages are $100,000, and P has settled with D for $5,000 and
has executed a release in his favor. At trial, the jury allocates the percentages of
fault among the parties as follows: P40% (equitable share, $40,000), B30%
(equitable share, $30,000), C20% (equitable share, $20,000), and D10% (equi-
table share, $10,000). From this situation, two main issues arise: (1) the finality
of the settlement as against B and C; and (2) what amount of the settlement, if any,
will be credited to B and C.
20 1
As to the effect of the settlement, three uniform acts have resolved this issue in
different ways. The 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act stated that B
and C would be able to obtain contribution against D regardless of the release.202
This result was not acceptable because a tortfeasor would remain liable for contri-
bution and had no incentive to settle. 23 The 1955 Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act did not permit B and C to have contribution from D unless the re-
199. Id. at 69-70.
200. John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 193, 206 (1986). See also National Farmers Union Property v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo.
1983).
201. See Fleming, supra note 159, at 1494.
202. See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRnFAsoRs ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975). Under the 1939 Act, each
tortfeasor was liable for his pro rata share. The settling tortfeasor remained liable for the amount of his pro-rata
share which was in excess of the settlement amount. Id. § 4, at 58. See Fleming, supra note 159, at 1494.
203. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 42, 56-57 cmt. (Supp. 1992).
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lease or covenant not to sue was procured in bad faith.24 While the benefit may be
the encouragement of settlements, the cost is the unfairness to the non-settling de-
fendants in not permitting them to obtain contribution by way of an agreement to
which they were not privy.2' This result is also inconsistent with pure compara-
tive negligence principles since it prevents a reallocation of the original judgment
(through contribution) and thus does not promote apportionment of the loss ac-
cording to the fault of each culpable party. 206
Due to the discontent with the 1955 approach, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws offered a different proposal in 1977.207
Section 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides that a release completely
discharges the tortfeasor from any contribution claims.28 The drawback is that the
plaintiffs ultimate recovery is reduced by the amount of the equitable share of the
released tortfeasor and thus may not encourage settlements.29 Apparently the
Commission on Uniform State Laws was aware of that aspect but found that its
proposal was more consistent with proportionate fault principles.210 The effect of a
release on a defendant's right to obtain contribution has not been much of an issue
in Mississippi for one principal reason: under the joint judgment rule, Mississippi
defendants have never been able to obtain contribution from tortfeasors who were
not made parties to the action.
211
The second issue to be addressed when considering the effect of a release or
covenant not to sue on non-settling defendants is the type of adjustments a court
will make to the plaintiffs recovery. One method is to reduce the amount of dam-
ages that the defendants have to pay by the amount of consideration paid by the
settling tortfeasors. 212 This approach has been adopted in Mississippi.213 The
204. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
205. See Fleming, supra note 159, at 1495. "[Wlhile there is an undoubted public benefit in settlement, that
benefit accrues only where al claims relating to the loss are included." Id. Even though one tortfeasor settles with
the plaintiff, it does not prevent congestion in the courtrooms since the plaintiff is going to bring suit against the
non-settling parties anyway. If a settlement with all defendants is not possible, is it not more convenient to simply
bring all culpable parties into one action and apportion the loss in accordance with each of their respective per-
centages of fault?
206. See id. See also Wade, supra note 199, at 207. There is no apportionment according to fault since the set-
tling defendant may agree to pay a larger or smaller share than he would have actually been allocated by a jury.
207. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1992).
208. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 42, 56 (Supp. 1992).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 56-57 cmt.
211. In Mississippi, the plaintiff can pick and choose which defendants to sue. Naturally, the plaintiff will not
sue a tortfeasor with whom a settlement has been made. Since a defendant cannot implead the settling tortfeasor
on the basis of contribution, the plaintiffs settlement effectively prevents the defendant from obtaining contribu-
tion from that settling tortfeasor. See discussion supra part II. C-D. Under the new legislation, a defendant in this
state still may not have a right of contribution against non-party tortfeasors. See discussion infra part V.
212. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 16.5, at 264.
213. See Wood v. Walley, 352 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Miss. 1977) (citing Bogdahn v. Pascagoula St. Ry. & Power
Co., 79 So. 844, 845 (Miss. 1918) (where plaintiff was injured by concurring negligence of A and B and plaintiff
entered into a covenant not to sue A in return for $7,500, the jury should allow a $7,500 credit when assessing
damages against B)); cf Bailey v. Delta Elec. Light, Power & Mfg. Co., 38 So. 354, 355 (Miss. 1905) (dicta
stating that a joint tortfeasor would have any amount of damages awarded against him credited by the amount
received in the settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the other joint tortfeasor).
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other method is to reduce the damage award by the "percentage of the causal negli-
gence attributed to the settling defendant(s)," which effectively limits the amount
that non-settling defendants must pay to the percentage of negligence attributable
only to them.214 In order to reduce the verdict in this manner, the negligence of the
settling defendants necessarily must be determined by the jury. Thus, it has been
held that the negligence of settling tortfeasors - non-party defendants - must be
considered for the purpose of making this percentage reduction to the verdict.215
This view has been adopted by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.216
Applying these two views to the hypothetical given above (where P40 % settled
with D 10 %), D paid only $5,000 even though the jury ultimately determined his
equitable share to be $10,000. As discussed above, B30% and C20% cannot ob-
tain contribution from D 10 % .217 Ps recoverable damages against B, C and D are
$60,000 (since P was forty percent responsible for his own injuries). In Missis-
sippi ("amount of consideration" 218 view), P recovery is reduced by $5,000
which is the amount of consideration paid by D in his settlement agreement with P
Note that although the aggregate of B and Cs equitable shares equal $50,000, they
have to pay $55,000, an amount greater than their allocated share.219
However, under the "percentage of negligence" view, 220 the plaintiffs recovery
would be reduced by $10,000. This amount represents the ten percent equitable
share attributable to D. From the plaintiffs perspective, he makes a "profitable"
settlement agreement where the settlement value is greater than the settling de-
fendant's equitable share allocated to him by the jury. At trial, it is in the plaintiff's
best interest to show, not only that his own negligence was slight, but that the neg-
ligence of the settling defendant was minimal as well. 221 Plaintiffs strategy not-
withstanding, this approach is preferable in terms of comparative negligence
because it adheres more closely to allocation based on comparative fault.222
214. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 16.5, at 264.
215. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W2d 106, 111-12 (Wis. 1963). The court in Pierringer pointed out that it
makes no difference that these settling defendants are joined for the limited purpose of allocating causal negli-
gence since their liability has already been fixed and they have "bought their peace" through their settlement
agreements. Id. at 112.
216. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 42, 56 (Supp. 1992).
217. Under the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, B30 % and C20% would be held jointly and severally liable
for $50,000 (which is the aggregate of their individual equitable share; i.e., $30,000 plus $20,000). If P40%
recovered the entire judgment from B30%, B would have an action for contribution only against C20% for
$20,000.
218. MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (1991).
219. In this situation, the plaintiff struck a bad bargain because his settlement agreement was for an amount
which was less than what the jury awarded against that settling tortfeasor ($10,000). But it can certainly work to
the plaintiffs advantage where the settlement agreement is greater than $10,000. The problem for the plaintiff is
that any windfall the plaintiff receives through the settlement agreement is translated to a credit for the party-
defendants.
220. UNin. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 42, 56 (Supp. 1992).
221. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, § 16.5, at 264 ("In this respect, plaintiff is stepping into the shoes of the
tortfeasors with whom he has settled.").
222. Although this approach may not be as conducive to settlements as possible, it may not be any more likely
to reduce congestions in the court system as some of the proffered alternatives. See supra note 147 and accompa-
nying text.
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IV. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A. Legislative Modification in Mississippi
As is evident in the title of the legislation, the intent of the legislature in passing
section 85-5-7 was to limit joint and several liability damages caused by two or
more persons. The statute is not exactly the paradigm of clear legislative drafting.
Perhaps the most logical way to understand it is to read subsection (3) as setting
forth the general rule. With two exceptions,22 the general rule is that "liability for
damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be several only, . . . and a joint
tort-feasor shall be liable only for the amount of damages allocated to him in direct
proportion to his percentage of fault."224 The impact of this statement, standing
alone, would be to abolish joint and several liability in favor of several liability.
The exceptions, however, are highly material. The first exception is the one al-
ready mentioned: The limitation on joint and several liability damages does not
apply to concerted action cases.225
The other exception is the most important. It provides that "the liability for
damages caused by two (2) or more persons shall be joint and several only to the
extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death or loss to recover fifty per-
cent (50%) of his recoverable damages."228 Returning to our hypothetical, suppose
that the plaintiff, A, has suffered damages of $100,000. This time, however, the
plaintiff was contributorily responsible for thirty percent of his damages while B
and C were respectively ten percent and sixty percent responsible. Assume that A
sued both defendants, but that C was insolvent. Reading section 85-5-7 as a whole,
the liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be several only, ex-
cept that joint and several liability will be imposed to the extent necessary for A to
recover fifty percent of his or her "recoverable damages."227 The term "recover-
able damages" indicates the plaintiffs total amount of damages reduced by the per-
centage of fault attributable to the plaintiff.228 Thus, A's recoverable damages
would be $70,000 since A was thirty percent contributorily responsible for his or
her own injuries. Due to Cs insolvency, A will seek to recover from B 10 %. Under
223. MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(3) (1991) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsections (2) and (6) of this
section").
224. Miss CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(3) (1991) (emphasis added).
225. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(6) (1991). Therefore in terms of damages, the traditional notion ofjoint
and several liability applies. See discussion supra part H.C.
226. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(2) (1991) (emphasis added). This limitation on joint and several liability is
strikingly similar to Louisiana's recent reform. "[L]iability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be
solidary only to the extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2324(B) (West 1992).
227. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(2) (1991).
228. See Rodda v. White, 584 N.E.2d 879, 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (plaintiffs recoverable damages are the
total damages reduced by his or her percentage of fault); Forche v. Gieseler, 436 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (extent of plaintiffs contributory negligence should be applied to reduce his or her recoverable dam-
ages in accordance with comparative negligence principles). "Recoverable damages" simply indicates the amount
that a plaintiff is permitted to recover under pure comparative negligence principles. "In all actions hereafter
brought for personal injuries. . . damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person injured." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
1992]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
the dictates of the statute, A can recover $35,000 (fifty percent of A's recoverable
damages) from B, notwithstanding the fact that B would have been severally liable
for only $10,000. Nevertheless, B cannot complain too loudly because he would
have been jointly and severally liable for the entire $70,000 before the passage of
the statute. 229
B. Apportioning the Uncollectible Shares
There are many reasons why any given tortfeasor's share could be uncollecti-
ble, 230 but the most common is insolvency. There are essentially three ways to allo-
cate uncollectible shares in the multiple tortfeasor context. Joint and several
liability places the risk on the remaining defendants in the action, while several lia-
bility leaves the plaintiff with the risk of uhicollectibility. 231 The third method is a
compromise position where the tortfeasor's uncollectible share is divided among
all culpable parties - including the plaintiff if he or she was negligent - according
to their respective shares of responsibility.
1. Joint and Several Liability
Under joint and several liability, the plaintiff, A, can recover $70,000 from B
and simply ignore C. Having a right of contribution is not much consolation to B
since C is insolvent. 232 Although liability clearly has not been apportioned accord-
ing to fault in this situation, some courts sitting in pure comparative negligence
jurisdictions have attempted to justify why the solvent defendant should bear all of
the loss.
The four most often cited reasons for retaining joint and several liability in a
pure comparative negligence system include: (1) feasibility of apportioning fault
does not render an indivisible injury divisible; 233 (2) defendant's culpable conduct
is not equivalent to the plaintiffs culpable conduct; 234 (3) the law favors full com-
pensation for an injured plaintiff;2 3' and (4) most other courts which have consid-
ered the issue have retained joint and several liability.236 The notion that an injury
is indivisible rests on the common law principle that where a tortfeasor's negli-
229. The impact on loss apportionment between the plaintiff and defendants in this situation is examined in a
later section. See discussion infra part IV.C.
230. The various circumstances which give rise to the absent tortfeasor problem are considered to be uncollect-
ible shares for the purposes of this article. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
231. See Brewer, supra note 127, at 605; McNichols, supm note 173, at 12; Thofner, supra note 192, at 301-
03.
232. See Miller, supra note 160, at 837-38 (loss apportionment among multiple tortfeasors does not work
against an insolvent tortfeasor).
233. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 905 (Cal. 1978); Coney v. J.L.G. In-
dus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (Ill. 1983) (Coney, which held that joint and several liability would be retained
under comparative negligence, has been superseded by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1987) which pro-
vides that any defendant whose proportionate negligence is 25 % or less is only severally liable); Seattle First Nat'l
Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Wash. 1978).
234. See American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 906; Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 205; Shoreline, 588 P.2d at 1314.
235. See American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 906; Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 205.
236. See American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 906; Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 432
(Alaska 1979); Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1987).
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gence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, then such tortfeasor was lia-
ble for the entire injury (because the injury itself is indivisible).237 "The rule grew
out of the common law concept of the unity of the cause of action; the jury could
not be permitted to apportion the damages, since there was but one wrong. 238 An-
other proffered justification of the unity concept was that it rewarded a "legally
'pure' plaintiff for these inherent inequities by allowing him to collect his entire
judgment from any defendant guilty of even slight negligence."239 The inherent in-
equities were the harsh effects of contributory negligence, and they virtually as-
sured that plaintiffs would be free of fault; i.e., a "pure" plaintiff.
24°
The advent of comparative negligence shattered the notion of an indivisible in-
jury and rendered the reason for the rule virtually obsolete.241 In most tort actions,
the injured plaintiff is compensated by an award of money damages, which is a
quantitative term and is certainly divisible. 242 Thus, with a quantitative term in
the numerator, the only thing that would make an injury "indivisible" is the ab-
sence of a logical or reasonable basis for determining the denominator. 2 3 In tort
actions involving one plaintiff and one defendant under a comparative negligence
system, juries provide the denominator to the equation by assigning responsibility
to the respective parties. If the apportionment of fault by a jury provides a reason-
able basis in the single plaintiff-single defendant situation, then juries can lik6-
wise provide that same reasonable basis in the multiple tortfeasor context. 2" "To
say that the injury is indivisible is not a descriptive statement of impossibility of
division; rather, it is a restatement of the conclusion that the damages expressed in
quantitative terms will not be apportioned according to proportionate fault."245
The second reason for the obsolescence of the rule holding any defendant en-
tirely responsible for the plaintiffs injury is that the plaintiffs culpability is not
equivalent to a defendant's because the latter involves a danger to others whereas
the former involves only a lack of self-care . 2' The distinction is really not based
on any qualitative difference between the plaintiffs and defendants' culpability;
rather, it is based on a race to the courthouse to see who bears the labels "plaintiff'
and "defendant.'247 Suppose that A, B and C are each approaching an intersection
237. See American Motorcycle, 578 P.2d at 905-06.
238. Prosser, supra note 11, at 418. Recall the earlier discussion, supra note 13 and accompanying text, where
it was indicated that the English courts only permitted joinder where the defendants acted in concert. The notion
of unity was that when defendants acted in concert, the act of one was considered the act of all. See Prosser, supra
note 11, at 418. But with the more liberal American rules as to joinder of parties, the "unity" concept was associ-
ated with concurrent wrongdoers, and they henceforth became entirely liable for the "indivisible" injury as well.
239. Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 204-05 (Fla. 1987) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 204.
241. Id. at 205 (under comparative negligence, the need to reward "pure" plaintiffs no longer exists because the
inherent inequities have been eliminated); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 585
(N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (concept of one indivisible wrong is obsolete).
242. See Zavos, supra note 48, at 788-89.
243. See id. at 789.
244. See Brewer, supra note 127, at 617.
245. Zavos, supra note 48, at 789.
246. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 906 (Cal. 1978).
247. See Zavos, supra note 48, at 805.
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from different directions, and each is driving over the speed limit (i.e., negligent
conduct). All three attempt to avoid a collision by taking evasive action, but A
slams into a telephone pole while B (solvent) and C (insolvent) escape unharmed.
When A brings an action against B and C, A will be protected from Cs insolvency
while B will bear the brunt of it.2" Under this rationale, B is saddled with the insol-
vent tortfeasor's share because Bs negligent conduct was somehow worse than
A's. But what if the circumstances were such that A was able to avoid the collision
while B was the one who was injured? Now B is the plaintiff, and A is the one who
picks up Cs portion of the loss. Has there been a mysterious transformation in the
character of culpability because A went from "plaintiff' to "defendant"? The only
thing that changes is the fortuitous circumstance of who suffers the injury. The
qualitative character of the negligence of each party remains the same regardless
of who is denoted "plaintiff' or "defendant.
2 49
The third reason offered for retaining joint and several liability is to insure that
the plaintiff obtains a full recovery.2"' In other words, between the plaintiff,
A30% and the solvent defendant, B10 %, the latter should bear the total burden of
C's insolvency because a "plaintiff' is entitled to full recovery. Once again, this sit-
uation looks suspiciously similar to the fortuitous labeling discussed above. Fur-
thermore, why should B become a guarantor of C's solvency when A was more
negligent than B and was no less a proximate cause to his own injuries than was
B?2"1 One situation where joint and several liability seems to be justified is where
the plaintiff is totally free from fault.25 2
As to the fourth reason, suffice to say that American Motorcycle Ass' v. Superior
Court 5 3 may have set unfortunate precedent for all of the other courts that were to
consider the issue of retaining joint and several liability. The case has been cited
by virtually all of the courts addressing this question.25 4 This naturally leads to an
examination of the theoretical underpinnings supporting the result in American
Motorcycle, but as indicated above, the proffered justifications for retaining joint
and several liability should be called into serious question. The case cited to cases
248. Id. at 804-05.
249. See id. at 805.
250. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 906 (Cal. 1978) ("One of the principal
by-products of the joint and several liability rule is that it frequently permits an injured person to obtain full re-
covery for his injuries even when one or more of the responsible parties do not have the financial resources to
cover their liability.").
251. See Fleming, supra note 159, at 1483.
252. Id. This result is not inherently inconsistent with the one under the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
where insolvency is redistributed among the remaining culpable parties according to their assigned percentages
of responsibility. In this case, the plaintiff is not a culpable party and does not participate in the reallocation pro-
cedure. See discussion infra part IV.B. 1.
253. 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978).
254. See, e.g., Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 434 (Alaska 1979) (citingAmerican Motor-
cycle); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (I11. 983) (citing American Motorcycle); Bartlett v.
New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (citing American Motorcycle); Seattle
First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Wash. 1978) (citing American Motorcycle).
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in some other jurisdictions which apparently considered the issue of retaining joint
and several liability, but of all these, only one seemed to be on point.
255
After considering the various justifications, it becomes apparent that joint and
several liability, without more, is at odds with apportioning fault on the basis of
responsibility, which is the principle that is at the heart of pure comparative negli-
gence. Joint and several liability differs from comparative negligence because it
requires a solvent defendant to bear the insolvency of a co-tortfeasor and thereby
apportions responsibility without regard to fault.
2. Several Liability
On the opposite end of the spectrum, several liability places the risk of insol-
vency solely on the plaintiff. If P30% was injured, sustaining $100,000 in dam-
ages, by B10% and by C60%, who is insolvent, P would be able to recover only
$10,000 from B because that is the extent of Bs liability. Thus, P is the one who
bears the total of Cs portion of the responsibility. This result is no better than the
one under joint and several liability and does equal violence to pure comparative
negligence principles. Like joint and several liability, it allocates the insolvent par-
ty's proportion of the loss without any regard to fault. P was only thirty percent
responsible for his own injuries, yet he is required to bear a greater percentage of
the loss. This result is unacceptable as well.
3. Compromise: Apportion the Tortfeasor's Uncollectible Share According to
Fault
In 1977, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Comparative Fault Act2.6 with a view towards addressing
the problems of loss allocation traditionally associated with joint and several lia-
bility. This is the method which most truly adheres to the dictates of pure compara-
tive negligence because it re-distributes a tortfeasor's uncollectible share
according to the percentage of fault of the remaining culpable parties.25 7 The Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act accomplishes this result by having the court enter
judgment against each tortfeasor on the basis of joint and several liability. 258 Also
included in the judgment is a determination of each party's equitable share of the
obligation to each claimant (i.e., their respective percentages of fault).259 If one
255. Zavos, supra note 48, at 787. Interestingly, one of the cases cited by the California Supreme Court as
exemplary of a jurisdiction which had addressed the issue and retained joint and several liability was Saucier v.
Walker, 203 So. 2d 299 (Miss. 1967). A thorough reading of the case reveals that the issue of retaining joint and
several liability in a comparative negligence system was not even remotely addressed. Instead, that case consid-
ered the proper form of a joint and several liability verdict. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
256. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 1992).
257. Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is entered, the court shall determine
whether all or part of a party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall
reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to
their respective percentages of fault.
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 42, 49 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
258. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 42, 49 (Supp. 1992).
259. See id.
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tortfeasor pays the entire judgment, the percentage-of-fault determinations pro-
vide a basis for that tortfeasor to obtain contribution from his or her fellow tort-
feasors. If any tortfeasor's share proves to be uncollectible, then a motion for
reallocation can be brought within one year after the entry of judgment.2 60 The re-
allocation procedure redistributes any uncollectible amount among the other cul-
pable parties according to their respective percentages of fault (including a
plaintiff at fault).
Assume the following: (1) P30% suffers $100,000 damages, (2) B1O% and
C1O% are both solvent defendants, and (3) D50% is an insolvent defendant. As-
suming all defendants have been joined in one action,2 61 P, whose recoverable
damages would be $70,000, could recover $10,000 from B and $10,000 from C.
The amount of damages allocated to an insolvent party would be $50,000. Who
bears this loss? The answer is that P, B and C all bear the insolvent party's share of
the loss according to their percentages of fault. The ratio among the culpable par-
ties is 1: 1:3. Out of the $50,000 uncollectible portion, one-fifth ($10,000) is allo-
cated to B, one-fifth ($10,000) is allocated to C, and three-fifths ($30,000) is
allocated to the plaintiff. This result is more consistent with pure comparative neg-
ligence principles because each party bears a portion that is based on the percent-
age of fault attributable to that party.
262
4. Section 85-5-7: Reform?
Section 85-5-7 accomplishes none of the three results mentioned above. In our
hypothetical, P30% had damages of $100,000 (thus, $70,000 recoverable dam-
ages) and brought an action against the only solvent defendant, B 10% (C60 % was
insolvent). Under the statute, B was jointly and severally liable to the extent neces-
sary for P to recover fifty percent of his recoverable damages, or $35,000. Al-
though Bi0% was proportionately liable for $10,000, he bears 41.67% of the
uncollectible share ($25,000). P, on the other hand, bears $35,000 (or 58.33 %)
of the uncollectible share. The fifty percent limitation on joint and several liability
appears to be an effort to reach a compromise between the plaintiff and defense
bars. Instead of fully retaining or completely abolishing joint and several liability,
the legislature assumed the biblical role of Solomon and proceeded to cut the baby
in half. As the discussion will present, this approach ignores the fact that joint and
several liability and contribution are simply methods of allocating and re-allocat-
260. UNiF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 42, 49 (Supp. 1992).
261. This is still a big assumption in Mississippi. A plaintiff is not likely to join an insolvent tortfeasor in the
action. This works to decrease the percentage of responsibility of the other defendants and perhaps decrease the
total recovery. A defendant will not be able to bring in the insolvent party since Rule 14 is still unavailable. See
discussion infra part V.
262. This is essentially the approach adopted in the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT:
Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether
all or part ofa party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate
any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respec-
tive percentages of fault.
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 2, 12 U.L.A. 42, 49 (Supp. 1992).
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ing uncollectible shares. Cutting a joint and several recovery in half does not ad-
dress the problem of allocating uncollectible shares more effectively. If the
legislature was truly attempting to strike a compromise through the fifty percent
limitation, it should have split the uncollectible share, not the recovery, equally
among the parties. Although this result would not be apportionment according to
fault, it would have been more of a compromise.
By re-apportioning the insolvent tortfeasor's share in accordance with the per-
centages of fault, the plaintiff would be liable for $45,000 (75 %) and B would be
responsible for $15,000 (25 %).263 Clearly, the plaintiff is better off under section
85-5-7 in this situation because he bears less of the insolvent share than under the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act. From a broader perspective, the plaintiff went
from being able to collect 100% of his judgment from B before the statute was
passed to only being able to collect 50 %. Instead of bearing no risk of insolvency,
the plaintiff bears 41 % of the uncollectible portion. The problem with the 50%
limitation on a plaintiffs joint and several liability damages is that it has no basis
under pure comparative negligence. Like most taxes, statutes of limitation, and
the like, it is simply legislative line-drawing. Furthermore, the Mississippi Legis-
lature has created a two-edged sword which will cut both against the defendant and
against the plaintiff, depending on the assigned percentages of fault.
To illustrate the effect of the statute, consider the following hypothetical involv-
ing the plaintiff, defendant B and defendant C. Assume that C will always be the
insolvent party. Thus in each of the following situations, the plaintiff has sued only
B and has been awarded $100,000 in damages. The only question remaining is
how to allocate the uncollectible portion. The following chart represents the distri-
bution of Cs uncollectible share under section 85-5-7 and the Uniform Compara-
tive Fault Act. Suffice it to say that before the enactment of section 85-5-7, B was
jointly and severally liable, paid all of the plaintiffs recoverable damages, and
bore the entire risk of uncollectibility.
In the first row of Figure 1 below, where P, B and C were respectively 10%,
10% and 80 % at fault, P's recoverable damages are $90,000. Since B was a 10 %
at-fault defendant, he is at least answerable for $10,000 under joint and several lia-
bility, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, or section 85-5-7. The difference be-
tween the three allocation methods is how each apportions C uncollectible share
($80,000 in the first row of Figure 1). Before section 85-5-7, B was jointly and
severally liable for $90,000: $10,000, representing the 10 % of fault originally al-
located to B, plus $80,000, representing the uncollectible 80% of fault originally
allocated to C. 264 Under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, C's uncollectible
share is reallocated among P and B according to their respective percentages of
263. P30% has a negligence ratio in comparison to BIO% of 3:1. Thus, the plaintiff would bear 3/4 of the
$60,000 uncollectible portion ($45,000) while B would bear 1/4 (or $15,000).
264. In his article, Professor Zavos divides Bs total payment into two parts: (1) culpable damages and (2) inno-
cent damages. The $10,000 portion represents Bs culpable damages since that amount represents the 10% of
fault originally apportioned to B. The $80,000 part represents Bs innocent damages because it is that portion of
the damages which exceeds B' 10% proportionate fault. See Zavos, supra note 48, at 797.
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fault. The ratio of B's percentage of fault (10 %) to Ps percentage of fault (10 %) is
1:1. Thus, out of Cs $80,000 uncollectible share, P pays $40,000 and B pays
$40,000.
Under section 85-5-7, there is joint and several liability to the extent necessary
for P to recover 50% of his recoverable damages (50% of $90,000, or $45,000).
Thus, B pays $45,000 to P But who bears C uncollectible portion in this situa-
tion? Because B has paid $45,000 but was originally liable only for $10,000 (i.e.,
10% at-fault defendant), B has effectively paid $35,000 (or 43.75 %) of C uncol-
lectible share. The other part of C's uncollectible share ($45,000, or 56.25 %) is
thrust upon P Likewise in row 2, B is held jointly and severally liable to the extent
necessary for P to recover 50% of his recoverable damages, or $40,000. By pay-
ing $40,000, B is really bearing $20,000 (or 33.33 %) of C uncollectible share
since B was originally liable for $20,000 (20 % at-fault defendant).
Figure 1.
HOW EACH PARTY BEARS C's UNCOLLECTIBLE SHARE:
APPORTIONMENT UNIFORM COMPARATIVE MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7
OF FAULT
26 5  Fault Act
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
P1O%, B10%, C80% P: $40,000 50% $45,000 56.25%
B: $40,000 50% $35,000 43.75%
P20%, B20%, C60% P: $30,000 50% $40,000 66.67%
B: $30,000 50% $20,000 33.33%
P30%, B30%, C40% P: $20,000 50% $35,000 87.50%
B: $20,000 50% $5,000 12.50%
P50%, B40%, CIO% P: $10,000 50% $20,000 100%
B: $10,000 50% $40,000 0%
As long as the ratio of fault apportionment between P and B is 1: 1, P and B will
always bear 50 % of the loss under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Yet under
section 85-5-7, P will always bear a greater and greater percentage of the insolvent
tortfeasor's share as B's percentage of responsibility increases-up to the point
where Bs percentage of fault equals or is greater than Cs percentage of fault. Once
B's percentage of responsibility exceeds C's percentage, B will effectively be sev-
erally liable for his own portion, and P will bear the entire risk of uncollectibility.
265. Recall that the plaintiffs "recoverable damages" is the relevant amount to consider in this analysis. That




HOW EACH PARTY BEARS C's UNCOLLECTIBLE SHARE:
APPORTIONMENT UNIFORM COMPARATIVE Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7
OF FAULT FAULT ACT
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
P10%, BIO%, C80% P: $40,000 50% $45,000 56.25%
B: $40,000 50% $35,000 43.75%
P, B20%, C70% P: $23,333 33.33% $45,000 64.29%
B: $46,667 66.67% $25,000 35.71%
PIO%, B30%, C60% P: $15,000 25% $45,000 75%
B: $45,000 75% $15,000 25%
PIO%, B40%, C50% P: $10,000 20% $45,000 90%
B: $40,000 80% $5,000 10%
PIO%, B50%, C40% P: $6.667 16.67% $40,000 100%
B: $33,333 83.33% $0 0%
PIO%, B60%, C30% P: $4,286 14.29% $30,000 100%
B: $25,714 85.71% $0 0%
P10%, B70%, C20% P: $2,500 12.50% $20,000 100%
B: $17,500 87.50% $0 0%
PIO%, B80%, CIO% P:$1,111 11.11% $10,000 100%
B: $8,889 88.89% $0 0%
The result under section 85-5-7 is backward. It penalizes the defendant who
is minimally at fault by requiring that person to bear a large share of Cs loss, yet
once Bs negligence exceeds the insolvent tortfeasor's share, then B is just severally
liable and does not have to bear any of the loss. It seems intuitively correct that
where a defendant's proportional negligence nears 100%, there is more justifica-
tion for that defendant to bear all of Cs loss, since his own conduct caused the ma-
jority of the loss anyway. Yet that is not the result under the statute.2 66 Under
comparative negligence, what principle justifies Bs paying a larger share of the in-
solvent tortfeasor's share when his culpability is equal to that of the plaintiff? Like-
wise, why should a plaintiff bear all of the loss of an insolvent tortfeasor, while the
liability of a grossly negligent defendant is limited? These results are very difficult
to reconcile under pure comparative negligence. The Appendix to this article con-
tains two additional charts which further indicate the numerical relationship
where the assigned percentages of negligence between the parties are varied.
V. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
Comparative contribution is another way of saying that liability among multiple
tortfeasors should be re-apportioned according to percentages of fault. This is ab-
266. See infra Appendix.
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solutely essential in a jurisdiction which has retained joint and several liability be-
cause it enables loss apportionment based on fault, and thereby faithfully adheres
to the principles of pure comparative negligence.267 One area that section 85-5-7
has clearly changed is that contribution is to be on a percentage of fault basis as
opposed to pro-rata division. It provides that the trier of fact shall determine the
percentage of responsibility of each party, but that a "defendant shall be held re-
sponsible for contribution to other joint tort-feasors only for the percentage of fault
assessed to such defendant."268
Section 85-5-7 is not clear as to whether the joint tortfeasors have been given a
substantive right to contribution. Subsection (4) of the statute provides that "[a]ny
defendant held jointly liable under this section shall have a right of contribution
against fellow joint tort-feasors. "'69 Without more, this would appear to give the
defendant the needed substantive right of contribution, enabling that defendant to
use Rule 14 to implead other "fellow joint tort-feasors" not originally joined by the
plaintiff. But what subsection (4) appears to give, subsection (8) takes away.
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to create a cause of action." 270 Although
subsection (4) purports to give a defendant held jointly and severally liable the
right to proceed against tortfeasors who were not made parties to the action,271
subsection (8) negates the inference.
If the statute does not give a defendant the right of contribution against fellow
joint tortfeasors not made parties to the action, then the net effect is that such a
defendant only has a right of contribution against tortfeasors who were brought
into the action by the plaintiff. That result sounds strikingly similar to the joint
judgment rule under the previous contribution statute. Two reasons bolster this
conclusion. First, subsection (4) provides that a "defendant shall be held responsi-
ble for contribution to other joint tort-feasors only for the percentage of fault as-
sessed to such defendant."272 The italicized terms must refer to tortfeasors who
were already made parties to the action. Any other interpretation is nonsensical.
Thus, the provision appears to be couched in terms which indicate that contribu-
tion is only permitted among tortfeasors brought into the action by the plaintiff.
The second reason is that subsection (6) provides that a defendant held jointly and
severally liable on a theory of concerted action or common plan shall have a right
of contribution "from his fellow defendants acting in concert. 273 The clear import
267. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 369.
268. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(4) (1991).
269. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(4) (1991) (emphasis added).
270. MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(8) (1991).
271. The language used in subsection (4) is that a "defendant" has a right of contribution against "fellow joint
tort-feasors." That implies that a defendant has a right to bring a contribution suit against a tort-feasor who was
not made a party to the action. If the legislature had intended to limit a defendant's right of contribution to only
those other tortfeasors involved in the action, it could have said that a defendant has a right of contribution against
"fellow defendants" or "joint tort-feasors made parties to the action."
272. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(4) (1991).
273. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(6) (1991).
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of this statement is that the legislature only intended to grant a right of contribution
to defendants as against other defendants made parties to the action by the plaintiff.
Before the passage of section 85-5-7, if B10% and C60% each contributed to
the injuries of P30% ($100,000 damages), and P30% recovered damages from
B10%, the latter would have been jointly and severally liable for the entire amount
($70,000 in recoverable damages). Before the passage of the statute, B would have
no recourse against C (notwithstanding the fact that C was solvent) because there
was no substantive right to contribution, and P10% could sue whomsoever he
chose. The net result is that B pays the total amount of the loss ($70,000) without
any regard to fault. No more arguments can be made to justify such a result in a
pure comparative negligence state such as Mississippi. As long as there is compen-
sation, why should the plaintiff be heard to complain about the source from which
the funds come? Between two solvent defendants, why should the plaintiff be able
to place the burden of paying the judgment on one of them when both are able to
pay?
The answer proposed and enacted by the Mississippi Legislature was a limita-
tion on joint and several liability.274 In an indirect way, the statute provides an in-
centive to P30% to sue both B10% and C60%. This will be the only way the
plaintiff can obtain a full recovery, since he or she will only be able to recover 50 %
of the recoverable damages from B10%. Instead of providing incentives to the
plaintiff by arbitrarily reducing the recovery, a better approach would be to give
the right to join absent tortfeasors to the defendants already in the litigation. There
would be no reason to limit the recovery of P30% if B10% could bring C60% into
the action through impleader. The only obstacle preventing party-defendants from
joining absent tortfeasors is the lack of a substantive right to contribution. Further
legislative amendment is needed to cure the defect.
In the final analysis, when parties are able to pay, they should be liable in ac-
cordance with their proportionate shares of fault. That is the result dictated by a
system of pure comparative negligence, and that is why a substantive right of con-
tribution is critical. Insofar as section 85-5-7 achieves the same effect as the joint-
judgment rule, it is inadequate. Liability will not be apportioned according to fault
if defendants are not entitled to pursue other tortfeasors responsible for the plain-
tiffs injuries. Although the statute may indirectly provide the plaintiff with some
incentive to join as many responsible parties as possible, the more effective way
would be to provide a clear right of contribution against non-party tortfeasors.
VI. CONCLUSION
By adopting pure comparative negligence in 19 10 and abolishing contributory
negligence, the Mississippi Legislature supposedly indicated that a plaintiff who is
only partially at fault cannot fairly be required to bear the entire loss. Logically, it
would seem to follow that a defendant only partially responsible for causing dam-
age to the plaintiff would not be required to bear the entire loss either. However,
274. See supra part IV.A, IV.B.4
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that fact does not necessarily mean that joint and several liability must be com-
pletely abolished. It ensures that a plaintiff is compensated by initially placing the
risk of insolvency on the defendants. As long as there are effective methods of re-
allocating liability according to the percentages of fault of each culpable party,
then the system can still adhere to the principles of pure comparative negligence.
Unfortunately, section 85-5-7 has destructive consequences regarding loss appor-
tionment between a plaintiff vis-a-vis multiple defendants and loss apportionment
among the defendants themselves. Where two or more persons cause damage to a
plaintiff, the statute arbitrarily limits a plaintiffs recovery because it allows for
joint and several liability only to the extent necessary for the plaintiff to recover
50% of his or her recoverable damages.
As to apportionment among the tortfeasors themselves, the statute provides for
contribution based on comparative fault. Although this is an improvement over the
pro-rata method under the prior contribution statute, section 85-5-7 does not pur-
port to give a right of contribution against fellow tortfeasors not made parties to the
action by the plaintiff. Without a substantive right of contribution, tortfeasors
have no basis on which to implead other tortfeasors who may have been responsi-
ble. Thus, a defendant's right of contribution (and ability to re-apportion liability
to those individuals who may have been responsible) is severely restricted because
it will depend on whom the plaintiff decides to join in the action. Although the
modifications achieved in section 85-5-7 certainly "change" the law, one should
not go so far as to call it "reform." Pure comparative negligence principles are
merely illusory in the multiple tortfeasor context, and section 85-5-7 brings us no



































































How EACH PARTY BEARS C's UNCOLLECTIBLE SHARE:
APPORTIONMENT UNIFORM COMPARATIVE Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7
OF FAULT FAULT AcT
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
P80%, B1O%, C1O% P: $8,889 88.89% $10,000 100%
B: $1,111 11.11% $0 0%
P70%, B20%, C1O% P: $7,778 77.78% $10,000 100%
B: $2,222 22.22% $0 0%
P60%, B30%, C1O% P: $6,667 66.67% $10,000 100%
B: $3,333 33.33% $0 0%
P50%, B40%, C1O% P: $5,556 55.56% $10,000 100%
B: $4,444 44.44% $0 0%
PI0%, B50%, C1O% P: $4,444 44.44% $10,000 100%
B: $5,556 55.56% $0 0%
P30%, B60%, C1O% P: $3,333 33.33% $10,000 100%
B: $6,667 66.67% $0 0%
P20%, B70%, C1O% P: $2,222 22.22% $10,000 100%
B: $7,778 77.78% $0 0%
P1O%, B80%, C1O% P: $1,111 11.11% $10,000 100%
B: $8,889 88.89% $0 0%
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